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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines a number of issues that arise in U.S. Congressional
elections. In the first chapter, I look at the source congressional campaign
contributions. I show that the source of a campaign contribution is an im-
portant factor in determining the effect the contribution has. Specifically I
find that individual contributions have a greater impact on election results
than corporate contributions. I show that the reason for this difference is
that in addition to direct spending effects, individual contributions are also
a reflection of a candidate’s quality and thus contain an indirect quality ef-
fect. I then use 3SLS to obtain an estimate of all the effects involved with
campaign contributions. The results present a better understanding of the
true effects of money in an election.
In the second chapter I look at the dynamics of party spending in congres-
sional campaigns. I examine a model of political parties who must choose
how to allocate campaign contributions over elections in several districts in
order to maximize the chance that they will control the enacted legislature.
The parties must compete in two areas, informed voters who only care about
policy and uninformed voters who only care about campaign spending. I find
that parties will choose to heavily concentrate their spending in whichever
district is most competitive.
In the third chapter I examine the causes of congressional gridlock. I
examine a model of two parties that must negotiate in order to choose a
policy to enact. The parties compete in elections in two bodies of a legislature
and the winning candidates engage in a bargaining process to determine the
implemented policy. I find that policy motivation and election uncertainty
are the main drivers of gridlock. I also find that compromising can end up
hurting a party and helping the non-compromising party. This leads to the
possibility of an equilibrium with gridlock even though there are high costs
to both parties associated with failing to compromise.
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CHAPTER 1
Average Joe Versus Super PACs: Does the
Source of Campaign Contributions Matter?
1.1 Introduction
Spending is a vital part of U.S. elections, with the 2012 Congressional elec-
tions alone involving over $3.5 billion. With so much money involved a
natural question that often comes up is how does this spending affect elec-
tion results. The traditional way this question has been posed has involved
the amount of money spent by each candidate but not where that money
came from.
Many candidates like to boast that they are running a grassroots cam-
paign, with the implication being that they have the support of the people
and therefore can expect to perform better in the election. If this is true
then the source of campaign contributions could be an important factor. Be-
cause corporations do not have a vote, only contributions from individuals
will represent votes during the election. Of course the fraction of voters
who contribute to a candidate is relatively small and thus the actual vote
share represented by donors may not have a significant effect on the election.
However, the actions of donors should be reflective of the actions of voters
as well.
In this paper I examine whether the source of campaign contributions plays
a role in determining the effect those contributions have on election results.
I find that individual contributions have a greater impact than corporate
contributions because they represent both money and votes whereas corpo-
rate contributions represent only money. I show that there are in fact two
separate effects that occur related to campaign contributions. The first effect
is the direct spending effects that is a result of increased spending leading
to higher vote shares. However, there is a also an indirect effect that is con-
tained in individual contributions which involves the relationship between
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campaign contributions and candidate quality.
In order to show why the source of a contribution would make a differ-
ence, I first propose a theoretical framework in which candidates of differing
quality compete in an election. I show that unlike corporate contributions,
individual contributions are a reflection of a candidate’s quality. Because
candidates who are higher quality will attract more contributions, the very
fact that a candidate receives a contribution is a reflection of that candidate
being of higher quality and thus that candidate should be expected to per-
form better in the election. This means that individual contributions will
lead to a direct spending effect as well as an indirect quality effect whereas
corporate contributions will only lead to the direct spending effects. There-
fore we should expect individual contributions to be more closely related to
a candidate’s electoral success.
I then attempt to test this theory using congressional election data from the
past 30 years. Empirical estimation of election results is always complicated
by problems of endogeneity, particularly with incumbent spending. If an
incumbent is in a safe race they will tend to not spend as much as if they were
in a close race, leading to an apparently negative relationship. This is a result
of incumbent spending and election results being simultaneously determined
which leads to biased estimates of the effect of incumbent spending. This is a
well documented problem that unfortunately does not have an easy solution.
I therefore proceed in two directions. I first look for evidence that the source
of campaign contributions is indeed an important factor. I then attempt to
estimate the effects of campaign contributions using three stage least squares
to overcome the simultaneity problem.
I find that individual contributions do have a significantly larger effect on
election results than corporate contributions. I further show that this is very
likely a result of a close relationship between individual contributions and
candidate quality. I attempt to control for this relationship by including the
number of individual donations made to each candidate. Even after control-
ling for the amount of contributions made to each candidate, the number
of donations is highly significant, suggesting that the number of supporters
a candidate has will in part predict how well the candidate will do in the
election. This new measure gives a way of controlling for candidate quality
in a way that is driven by the actions of voters.
My findings have a number of implications. Distinguishing the source of
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campaign contributions allows for more accurate estimation of the effects of
campaign spending. It also gives a more precise understanding into the true
effects of money in elections. While campaign contributions were previously
assumed to only affect election results through their spending effects, the
results here show that they are also reflective of a candidate’s quality and
previous estimates have actually been of the combined effects of both spend-
ing and quality. This gives a new insight into quantitatively estimating a
candidate’s quality.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
In order to show why the source of campaign contributions would affect
election results, I consider an election with two candidates competing for
a Congressional seat. Candidates compete in two dimensions of quality,
the quality for voters, qj, and the quality for corporations, cj. Quality is
defined as a candidate’s campaigning skills or any personal characteristics
that would make them appealing to individuals or corporations. Quality
therefore contains anything that would affect voting behavior other than a
candidate’s policy positions. Voters and corporations make decisions based
on the relative quality of the two candidates. The relative individual quality,
q = q1−q2 is distributed according to distribution f and the relative corporate
quality, c = c1 − c2, is distributed according to distribution h.
Each individual receives a private signal, si, about q. si is distributed ac-
cording to g(s|q) with E(si) = q. Corporations receive a private signal, ri
about c. ri is distributed according to ψ(r|c) with E(ri) = c. Individuals
make two decisions, how much to contribute to either candidate and who to
vote for. Corporations make only one decision, how much to contribute. Indi-
viduals and corporations make contribution decisions based on their private
signals about relative candidate quality.
Individuals and corporations have utility functions UI(qX , YI) and UC(cX , YC)
respectively where qX and cX are the qualities of the winning candidate and
Yj is the individual or corporation’s wealth level. Utility functions are in-
creasing in qX and Yj. Election results are uncertain and thus an individual’s
expected utility will be
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E(UI) = P1UI(q1, YI − d) + P2UI(q2, YI − d) (1.1)
where Pj is the probability that candidate j wins and d is the amount of
contribution the individual makes. I will make two simplifying assumptions
about the form of the utility function. The first is that the marginal utility
of wealth is independent of the winning candidate and the second is that the
difference in utility for two winning candidates is a function of their relative
quality, q (or c). This allows the utility functions to be written simply as
a function of the relative quality and leads to first order equation for the
contribution decision:
P ′1UI(q, YI − d)− U ′I(q, YI − d) = 0 (1.2)
where P ′1 is the change in candidate 1’s probability of winning for an extra
contribution and U ′I is the marginal utility of income.
Let dI(s) be an individual’s contribution function and DI(q) be the net
total contributions made to candidate 1. There are a continuum of voters
with distribution g(s|q) and therefore DI(q) =
∫
dI(s)g(s|q)ds
Corporations make a similar contribution decision based on their pri-
vate signals of c. Let dC(r) be a corporation’s contribution function, then
DC(c) =
∫
dC(r)ψ(r|c)dr is the net total amount contributed by corporations
to candidate 1. Finally let T (q, c) = DI(q) +DC(c) be the total net amount
contributed to candidate 1.
Candidates spend any contributions they received from individuals or cor-
porations on advertising in order to demonstrate to voters the amount of sup-
port they received. Because contributions are increasing functions of quality
signals, voters can infer that a candidate who received more contributions
is more likely to be of higher quality. The amount of individual contribu-
tions to each candidate is a function of q and thus if voters could observe
the amount of individual contributions to a candidate they would be able to
perfectly infer the true relative quality of the candidates. However, voters
only observe the total amount of contributions, T (q, c), and which is only
a noisy signal of individual quality. Voters use this information to update
their beliefs about the candidates’ individual quality. Voters form posterior
beliefs, fp(q), through Bayesian updating.
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fp(q|s, T ) = g(s|q)f(q)h(D
−1
C (T (q, c)−DI(q)))∫
g(s|q)f(q)h(D−1C (T (q, c)−DI(q)))dq
(1.3)
Once voters form their posterior beliefs they then use them to decide which
candidate to vote for based on whichever candidate they believe has the
higher expected quality. The posterior beliefs are an increasing function of
the total amount of spending by each candidate. This is the most commonly
understood way that campaign contributions affect election results, higher
spending by a candidate leads to higher posterior beliefs and therefore a
higher vote share. Thus by receiving contributions from individuals or cor-
porations, candidates are able to convince more voters to vote for them. I
will call this the direct spending effect: the increase in a candidate’s vote
share that results from increased spending.
Definition 1 Direct Effect: β1 =
∂Vj
∂T (q,c)
where Vj is candidate j’s vote share. However, the posterior beliefs are
also an increasing function of the individual’s private signal, s. This means
that individuals with higher prior beliefs relative to other individuals will also
have higher posterior beliefs. Because the private signals are centered around
the true relative quality of the candidates, if a candidate has a higher relative
quality voters overall will have higher prior beliefs about that candidate and
therefore will also have higher posterior beliefs. Thus as should be expected,
a candidate with a higher true individual quality should expect to do better
in the election.
The idea that candidate quality will affect election results is not a novel
concept. Many papers have attempted to control for candidate when pre-
dicting election results. However, what this model predicts is that candidate
quality is highly intertwined with the amount of contributions the candidate
receives. As mentioned earlier, the true relative quality is contained in the
amount of individual contributions. While the voters cannot observe this
information before the election, economists after the election are able to ob-
serve the amount of contributions from individuals and that amount should
be a reflection of candidate quality. This leads to the second effect of cam-
paign contributions which is often overlooked, contributions are themselves
an indication of a candidate’s quality. I will call this the indirect quality ef-
fect: the increase in vote share due to a candidate’s quality, being measured
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through individual contributions.
Definition 2 Indirect Effect: β2 =
∂Vj
∂DI(q)
∂DI(q)
∂q
These two effects could be thought of as follows: the direct effect would
be the effect of a candidate who happens to find $100 on the street and
spends it on advertisements. Although no one actually gave the candidate
the $100, voters will think it is a reflection of the candidate’s quality and
thus be more persuaded to vote for that candidate. The indirect effect would
be what would happen if an individual contributed $100 to a candidate and
the candidate then proceeded to throw the money in the trash. Even though
the $100 is not being spent, purely the fact that the individual was willing to
contribute it is a reflection of the underlying candidate quality. While this
is not perfectly seen by voters as they only observe total contributions, it
should be apparent to economists looking at the election results.
Clearly both individual and corporate contributions will contain the di-
rect effect. Contributions from either individuals or corporations will lead
to higher spending and since voters cannot distinguish between the source of
a contribution, both types of contributions should have the same spending
effects. The indirect effects, however, should only be found in individual con-
tributions. Corporate contributions are an indication of the true corporate
quality of the candidates but because corporate and individual quality are
uncorrelated, this will not have any effect on voters’ behavior. Therefore
individual contributions should contain both direct and indirect effects while
corporate contributions should contain only direct effects. This gives a way
to empirically test the setup. Consider a regression of election results based
on contributions separated by source:
V ote = α1Individual + α2Corporate+ αX +  (1.4)
We should expect to see α1 = β1 + β2 and α2 = β1. If there are indeed
indirect effects that reflect a candidate’s quality then β2 > 0 which means
α1 > α2.
This leads to the main contribution of this paper. While previous pa-
pers were attempting to measure the effect of a candidate spending a dollar,
by leaving out the indirect quality effect what they are actually measuring
is the effect of a candidate raising and spending a dollar. Here I expand
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upon previous work by separating the direct spending effect (β1) from the
indirect quality effect (β2). The addition of the indirect effect also adds to
the existing candidate quality literature by providing a way to quantitatively
measure candidate quality that is derived from the actions of voters and thus
represents a more accurate reflection of voter preferences.
1.3 Literature Review
Empirical estimation of spending effects is hampered by a problem of endo-
geneity. Incumbents who are in safe races have some measure of flexibility
over how much they spend. Since fundraising is typically seen as a very un-
pleasant activity, incumbents who aren’t forced to put as much time and ef-
fort into fundraising typically will not. The result is that incumbent spending
and expected election results are actually being simultaneously determined
with incumbents who expect to do well spending relatively little and incum-
bents who expect to do relative poor spending large amounts. This of course
leads to simultaneity bias which causes the estimates for incumbent spending
to appear insignificant or in some cases even negative.
This is a well known problem that was first discovered by Jacobson (1978).
He found that while challenger spending had a significant effect on election
results, the effect of incumbent spending was insignificant. He acknowledged
that this was most likely due to endogeneity and attempted to use TSLS
as a solution. The instrument he uses is spending by candidates in pri-
mary elections, with the idea that spending in primaries will serve to raise
name recognition, which will also help the candidate in the general election.
The problem with primaries as an instrument is that whether an incumbent
runs in a primary is in fact endogenous, with incumbents who are generally
vulnerable more likely to face a primary threat. Additionally being in a pri-
mary is only weakly correlated with spending amounts. This is reflected in
the results of the TSLS, where even after instrumenting the estimates for
incumbent spending were insignificant.
Since Jacobson’s work many papers have attempted to solve the simul-
taneity problem; however, most have had little success. The most common
approach is to look for better instruments for incumbent spending. Green
and Krasno (1988) use spending by the incumbent in the previous election as
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an instrument. The reasoning behind the instrument is that previous spend-
ing measures a candidate’s propensity to raise and spend money but because
it is lagged it should have nothing to do with the current election dynamics.
However, Jacobson (1990) and Abramowitz (1991) point out two major
shortcomings of this instrument. The first is that there is a high degree of
multicollinearity. If an incumbent spends a large amount in the previous
election, it is most likely a sign that they are facing a high quality challenger
and thus must increase their spending to fend off the challenge. If they are
successful then it will serve as a deterrent to future quality challengers and
thus in the next election the incumbent should face a lower quality challenger
and expect to perform better in the election. Jacobson shows that previous
spending is indeed highly correlated with the challenger’s vote share in the
previous election as well as challenger quality in the current election.
Another potential problem as pointed out by Abramowitz is that the mea-
sure they use for the challenger’s party strength is the challenger’s vote share
in the previous election. However, both the lagged incumbent’s spending and
the lagged challenger’s vote share will both be closely related to the incum-
bent’s underlying base of support. This means that there will be a large
degree of confounding in the estimates for spending.
In a rebuttal to Jacobson and Abramowitz, Green and Krasno argue that
the arguments made do not invalidate lagged spending as an instrument.
They point out that multicollinearity would not lead to biased estimates
or standard errors. They also argue that if Jacobson’s claim that lagged
spending is also related to challenger quality and party strength the result
would be to understate the true effect of incumbent spending.
Another direction has been to look at survey data as an instrument. Jacob-
son (1990) uses a survey from The Washington Post that asks voters about
their ideological and demographical characteristics as well as who they intend
to vote for in the election. The advantage of the survey is that respondents
were polled at the beginning of the election cycle and again just prior to the
election. This allows Jacobson to look at the change in voting intentions over
time as a function of the amount of money spent by the candidates. However,
even using this survey data Jacobson still finds that challenger spending has
a significant effect on changing people’s vote but incumbent spending does
not.
Abramowitz (1991) attempts to solve the simultaneity problem by using
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a measure of elite expectations. He uses published ratings obtained from
interviews with campaign experts on the likely outcome of election races. In-
cluding these expectations is intended to control for other variables that may
be influencing election results but are not included in the analysis. However,
after including the expectation ratings, the estimates for spending did not
change significantly and the model had the same overall fit, indicating that
the results are not due to omitted variables. However, this analysis did not
account for the possibility of simultaneity bias.
Gerber (1998) uses state population and candidate wealth levels as instru-
ments for how much a candidate can spend. The reasoning is that candidates
in a larger state will have more donors to draw from and that wealthier candi-
dates will have more money to spend on their races. He looks at Senate races
and finds that after instrumenting both challenger and incumbent spending
is significant and that challenger spending still has a larger effect than in-
cumbent spending. He does not, however, look at House races.
Given the lack of success of instrumental variables, other papers have
turned to alternative approaches that don’t rely on instruments. Levitt
(1994) looks only at races in which the same incumbent ran against the
same challenger. By focusing only on repeat matchups, he hopes to control
for any unobserved factors that might influence the election. However, his
results also found that incumbent spending was insignificant.
Erikson and Palfrey (1998) used a covariance restriction approach to at-
tempt to solve the simultaneity problem. In it they assumed that incumbent
spending, challenger spending, and election results are all being simultane-
ously determined and they assumed that the errors between these equations
are uncorrelated, allowing the system to be fully identified. The reasoning
for why this would be a valid assumption is that the spending functions are
determined by the expected election results but are in fact determined prior
to any observed election error. Thus any unforeseen election result cannot
affect spending and anything that does affect spending is assumed to do so
indirectly through the expected election results.
Using this approach they find that both incumbent and challenger spend-
ing have significant effects on election results. However, their analysis is
dependent on the assumption that the errors between equations are uncorre-
lated. Unfortunately, it is difficult to test this assumption to determine if it is
violated. If there were some omitted variable, such as candidate quality, that
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directly affected both spending and election results then this model would
not be valid.
Goidel and Gross (1994) use a three stage least squares approach to esti-
mating spending effects. They construct a model in which candidate quality,
incumbent spending, challenger spending, and election results are simultane-
ously determined and use instruments to estimate the system as a whole.
Similar to Green and Krasno they use lagged incumbent and challenger
spending as instruments as well as the margin of victory by the incumbent
in the previous election. By using 3SLS they are able to use the simultaneity
to their advantage to obtain better estimates for the spending effects. They
find that both incumbent and challenger spending have significant effects,
although the effect of incumbent spending is much smaller than challenger
spending.
The vast majority of previous work has only considered the total amount of
contributions to each candidate and not where the contributions came from.
Only Depken (1998) looks at the difference that a source of a campaign
contribution makes and finds that PAC contributions have the largest effect
on election results. However, he does nothing to account for the simultaneity
problem and he only uses one election year, 1996.
As outlined above, the majority of papers that have investigated spending
effects have found that challenger spending has a significant effect while in-
cumbent spending does not. There are two possible explanations for these
findings. Either incumbent spending truly has very little effect on election
results or the problem of endogeneity has not been sufficiently solved. Given
that incumbents raise very large amounts of money, typically much higher
amounts than challengers, if the former explanation is true it would mean
that incumbents have a long history of wasting their time and effort for very
little gain. In addition, incumbents enjoy large advantages in Congress, with
re-election rates for incumbents in the House typically around 90%. If spend-
ing is not a reason for this advantage, then incumbents must gain an even
larger advantage elsewhere. It seems a more likely explanation that incum-
bents actually know what they are doing and that spending by incumbents
should have at least some effect and therefore the endogeneity problem has
not been completely overcome.
Candidate quality is another large area of election literature. Candidate
quality is a characteristic that would certainly affect election results and thus
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most papers agree that candidate quality should be in any model of elec-
tions. The problem is generally how to measure candidate quality. Quality
is typically a more intrinsic characteristic that is observed by voters through
interacting with candidates. It is hard to put into words what would make a
good candidate, much less find a good way to quantitatively measure quality.
The most common approach is to use whether candidates held previous
office as some measure of their quality. Jacobson (1978) measures challengers
by whether or not they have held previous office and incumbents by whether
they are chair or ranking member of a subcommittee or are in the party lead-
ership. Green and Krasno (1988) construct an eight point scale of candidate
quality. Candidates are assigned points for various characteristics that would
be appealing to voters such as holding previous office, celebrity status, and
job experience.
Squire (1992) ranks candidates based on holding previous office; however,
he assigns points on a scale depending on how prestigious the office held
was. He also incorporates the population of constituents that the candidate
represented while in office. He also includes a measure of campaigning skill
based on media stories about the candidate. He finds that both of these mea-
sures affect a candidate’s election results. Tillmann (2013) uses the amount
of times a candidate was mentioned in the media prior to the election as a
measure of quality. The idea is that prominent community members who
are mentioned more often are more likely to be higher quality challengers.
However, he is not able to account for negative publicity.
The issue with most of these measures of quality is they often rely on
arbitrary scales that have been constructed by the economist. While these
scales certainly are related to candidate quality, it is impossible to determine
how accurate they are in reflecting the voters’ true preferences. For example,
these scales would most likely rate Barack Obama, a former community or-
ganizer with very little experience in the Senate as a rather poor candidate
but they would rate Mitt Romney, a former successful governor who is very
wealthy and comes from a political family, as a very high quality candidate.
But it was Obama who was widely accepted as the better campaigner.
Furthermore these scales are implicitly defining the relative importance of
difference characteristics. For example, Green and Krasno assign 1 point to
candidates who are currently in office and 1 point to candidates who have
previously run for Congress. This implies that voters place equal weight on
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each of these two qualities. Whether or not that is an accurate representation
of voter preferences is impossible to determine but it is inherently assumed
by Green and Krasno and others. Therefore what is missing in the analysis
of candidate quality is some measure that is derived from voter actions and
thus truly reflects what voters consider a strong or weak candidate.
1.4 Data
I use federally provided election data that includes the percent of the vote by
each candidate as well as amount of contributions made to each candidate.
The fundraising data includes both the total contributions and donations
from individual donors. The difference between the two is what I use for
corporate contributions. Note that this definition of corporate contributions
includes money spent by supporting super PACs. Thus if an individual made
a large donation to a super PAC that supported a certain candidate, it would
be counted towards corporate contributions. Individual contributions only
include contributions made directly to the candidate’s campaigns, which are
limited to $5000 per person.
I use data from House races between 1984 and 2012. I only examine races
in which there was a candidate from each major party. I do not use races
with third party or independent candidates who captured a significant share
of the vote. If a third party or independent candidate received less than
5% of the vote, I ignore that candidate and recalculate the two major party
candidate’s vote share as a percentage of the remaining vote.
To measure district partisanship I use the Presidential Election results to
calculate a partisan voting index for each district. I will also later include the
number of individual donations made to each candidate. This is provided in
a separate document provided by the FEC that lists every donation made to
a candidate that is above $200 as well as its source. This is obviously not a
full list of donations but it is the only available statistic.
I also use information on the cost of television advertising that is pub-
lished by SQAD in the Media Market Guide. Using the published costs for
each media market as well as population information about each district I
construct a media cost index that measures how expensive advertising is in
each district.
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1.5 Individual vs Corporate Contributions
As discussed in the literature review, any estimation of the effects of cam-
paign contributions will be encumbered by the problem of simultaneity. Un-
fortunately there is no widely accepted solution for this problem as instru-
ments have proven particularly unfruitful. I will therefore proceed in two
directions. Since the main concern of this paper is whether the effects of
campaign contributions differ based on the source of the contribution, I will
first more or less ignore the endogeneity problem and the associated bias.
The estimates for spending effects will be highly suspect and I will thus
not focus on obtaining reliable estimates of the spending effects until later.
What I will do instead is acknowledge that for regular empirical methods the
estimates of spending effects themselves are more than likely to be biased
but the relative difference in effects between contribution source may still be
of interest. I therefore attempt to find evidence that the source of campaign
contributions plays a role in determining their effect despite the presence of
endogeneity.
This, however, does not allow me to answer the traditional question in
the literature, whether incumbent or challenger spending has a larger effect.
Therefore, I will later attempt to account for the simultaneity by using 3SLS
to estimate a system of equations involving spending, quality, and election
results. This will hopefully allow me to obtain better estimates of the effects
involved in campaign contributions.
1.5.1 Open Elections
Since the endogeneity problem is mainly a consequence of incumbents choos-
ing their own spending levels, I first look at open elections where there is
no incumbent running for reelection. In these elections there may still be
endogeneity. For example a Republican in a very red district will still not
have to spend much in order to win. However, due to the lack of incumbents
the amount of bias coming from the endogeneity should be much lower in
these races. The downside of looking at open elections is that they only com-
prise a small fraction of elections (13%). In addition they do not provide an
answer to the traditional question of the difference between incumbent and
challenger spending. However, they should serve to provide an initial test of
13
whether the source of campaign contributions is important.
Since there is no incumbent or challenger I separate candidates into Democrats
and Republicans. To investigate the difference in the source of campaign
contributions I separate contributions into individual and corporate. Since
previous papers have found that spending has decreasing returns to scale, I
use the square root of campaign contributions.
To test for the existence of a separate quality effect I include another
regressor, the number of donations from individuals made to each candidate.
If spending was the only effect involved then after controlling for the amount
of contributions, the number of people who donated to a candidate should not
make a difference. However, if individual contributions also include a quality
effect then the number of individual donors should be a way to measure at
least part of that effect. If a candidate has a higher number of individual
donors then it means that more individuals thought highly enough of the
candidate to make a contribution. This would suggest that the candidate
is more likely to be of higher quality. In this way the number of individual
donations will act as a proxy variable for candidate quality.
The FEC only provides a list of every individual donation above $200.
While this certainly leaves out a lot of the contributions, it is the best measure
that is available and it should be closely related to the total number of
individual contributions. Furthermore, since it leaves out donations under
$200, which most individual contributions will be, if anything this variable
will understate the effect.
I must also account for district partisanship, how many voters in each
district tend to vote Democratic or Republican. If a district is comprised
heavily of Democrats or Republicans then one candidate will be a heavy
favorite no matter what the spending levels are. To measure this I include
the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) for each district. This is calculated
by taking the most recent Democratic Presidential candidate’s vote share
in each district and subtracting the Democratic candidate’s national vote
share. Therefore a PVI of 0 would indicate an equal number of Democrats
and Republicans in a district, a positive PVI would indicate more Democrats,
and a negative PVI would indicate more Republicans.
National party trends tend to have large effects on congressional elections
and vary greatly from year to year. For example, almost every Republican
received a bump in the vote share in 2010 purely due to an anti-Obama fever.
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I therefore include yearly dummies to account for these national trends in
each election. Because the sample size is rather large there is a concern that
the standard errors may be biased downward due to correlation in the errors
between states. I therefore cluster the data by state to obtain more accurate
standard errors.
This leads to the following equation for open elections:
V = β0 +β1DI +β2DC +β3RI +β4RC +β5DD +β6RD +β7PV I+βiY eari+ 
(1.5)
where V is the Democratic candidate’s vote share
DI and DC are contributions to the Democratic candidate by individuals and
corporations
RI and RC are contributions to the Republican candidate by individuals and
corporations
DD and RD are the number of donations made to the Democratic and Re-
publican candidate, respectively
PV I is the partisan vote index
Y ear is the yearly dummy
The results in Table 1 indicate that spending has a significant effect for
both Democrats and Republicans. There may still be some endogeneity but
all estimates are the anticipated sign, which at least means that there are
no glaringly obvious contradictions. While this is certainly not a complete
validation of the model, open elections seems to at least lessen the immediate
problems that are inherent with incumbent elections.
Table 1 also shows that the estimates for individual and corporate contri-
butions appear to be quite different. This is confirmed in Table 2 which shows
that the effects of individual contributions are significantly higher than the
effects of corporate contributions for both Democrats and Republicans in the
House. Although the difference is not significant for the Senate, this is likely
due to the smaller sample size. If the only effect involved in campaign contri-
butions was the direct spending effect then the source of a contribution should
make no difference. This is therefore the first evidence that suggests there is
some other effect involved campaign contributions, in particular something
that makes individual contributions seemingly more important.
There are many possible explanations for this difference in effects. It could
be that individuals prefer to contribute to candidates who are more likely to
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Table 1.1: Open Seat Elections
Dem Vote
Democrat Individual 0.016∗∗∗
Contributions (0.0009)
Democrat Corporate 0.007∗∗
Contributions (0.002)
Republican Individual -0.017∗∗∗
Contributions (0.0008)
Republican Corporate -0.009∗∗∗
Contributions (0.001)
Democrat Number 0.007∗∗
Donations (0.003)
Republican Number -0.005∗
Donations (0.002)
PVI 0.128∗∗
(0.0392)
Constant 67.34∗∗∗
(9.47)
N 611
Contributions are in square root
Dependent variable is Democratic candidate’s vote share
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.2: Test for Individual Effect 6= Outside Effect
Democratic Contributions
F 7.29
P (> F ) 0.0078
Republican Contributions
F 5.81
P (> F ) 0.0213
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win. However, if this is true it would likely be the case for corporations as
well and, if anything, it would likely be more so the case for corporations
as they would prefer to contribute to winners in order to gain access and
influence. Therefore this is probably not the reason for the difference as it
would suggest that corporate contributions should have the bigger effect. It
could be the case that corporations like to hedge their bets, contributing
to both candidates in order to have access to whichever candidate wins.
However, the effects are being measured for both candidates and thus this
should be accounted for.
An explanation that does seem to make sense is that individual contribu-
tions are containing some extra information that isn’t contained in corporate
contributions. Candidate quality is something that would fit that description.
If a candidate receives an abnormally large amount of individual contribu-
tions then it is at least in part a signal that the candidate has a large number
of supporters and thus is of high quality, which will lead to more votes in
the election regardless of spending levels. Corporate contributions, on the
other hand, are much less likely to reflect a candidate’s quality. A candidate
that a corporation finds appealing is not necessarily a candidate that voters
will find appealing. This would mean that the reason for the extra effect
of individual contributions is that they are not only measuring the spending
effects of contributions but they are also indirectly measuring the effects of
candidate quality.
1.5.2 Incumbent Elections
Open elections gave an initial look at the effects of campaign contributions.
However, they were only a small portion of elections and they didn’t examine
the difference between incumbent and challenger spending effects. Therefore
in order to get a more complete picture I now turn to races that involve an
incumbent running for reelection.
OLS
As noted earlier, in these elections there should be a large problem with
simultaneity biasing the estimates. For now I will ignore this problem and
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continue with OLS in order to compare individual and corporate contribu-
tions. Later I will attempt to address the simultaneity problem in order to
get more accurate estimates.
The model is very similar to the model of open elections with a few small
changes. First, instead of separating candidates by party I separate them
into incumbents and challengers, allowing for the possibility that incumbent
spending has a different sized effect than challenger spending. Second, fresh-
man and sophomore incumbents tend to be more vulnerable than longer
serving incumbents. I will therefore include the number of terms an incum-
bent has started at the time of the election.
Finally, including yearly effects would then measure if an election is par-
ticularly good or bad for incumbents. This is not the desired yearly effect
as national waves tend to be more partisan oriented. Even in years where
there were a high number of successful challengers, it tends to be because
incumbents of a certain party are being ousted. Thus I will include dummy
variables that measure if a candidate is a Democrat or a Republican running
in each year. This leads to the following model:
V ote = β0 + β1II + β2IC + β3CI + β4CC + β5PV I + β6Term+
+ βi,DDemi ∗ Y eari + βi,RRepi ∗ Y eari +  (1.6)
where V ote is the Incumbent candidate’s vote share
II and IC are contributions to incumbent by individuals and corporations
CI and CC are contributions to challenger by individuals and corporations
PV I is the district partisanship
Term is number of terms incumbent has served
Dem and Rep are dummy variables indicating if the incumbent is a Democrat
or a Republican
Y ear is a dummy variable indicating the year of the election
As seen in Table 3, simultaneity does indeed appear to be a serious prob-
lem. The coefficients for incumbent corporate contributions are negative,
suggesting that an incumbent who receives more corporate contributions will
do worse in the election. This is a very dubious result that if true would mean
incumbents have been engaging in self-destructive actions. The more likely
explanation is that the coefficients for incumbent spending are being biased
18
Table 1.3: OLS Results
Dem Vote
Incumbent Individual -0.000887
Contributions (0.000986)
Incumbent Corporate -0.007355
Contributions (0.00718)
Challenger Individual -0.0211∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00188)
Challenger Corporate -0.00909∗∗∗
Contributions (0.000957)
Incumbent Number 0.00824∗
Donations (0.00382)
Challenger Number -0.0474∗∗∗
Donations (0.00996)
Terms Served 0.0818
(0.0442)
Incumbent PVI 0.218∗∗∗
(0.0175)
Constant 59.25∗∗∗
(0.920)
N 3878
Contributions are in square root
Dependent variable is Democratic candidate’s vote share
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
19
downward as a result of the simultaneity.
The estimate for incumbent individual contributions is positive, which
doesn’t immediately suggest the presence of simultaneity bias. However, the
magnitude of the effect, 0.76, is much smaller than the effect of challenger
individual contributions, −2.17. This could mean that challenger spending
is more effective than incumbent spending. However, it could also mean that
the estimate for incumbent individual contributions is being biased by simul-
taneity. Given that incumbent corporate contributions are very likely biased,
it seems reasonable to think that incumbent individual contributions would
be biased as well.
While the estimates for incumbent spending seem to be biased, the esti-
mates for challenger spending are much more believable. The estimates for
both challenger individual and corporate contributions are the anticipated
sign, a reasonable magnitude, and fairly consistent with previous literature.
This suggests that while it is still possible that challenger spending estimates
are biased, the amount of bias is likely not as severe as in the estimates for
incumbent spending.
This would seem to make sense intuitively. While incumbents have a great
deal of flexibility in choosing their spending levels if they are a heavy fa-
vorite, challengers will not have that luxury as they will never be considered
a favorite against an incumbent. Any candidate who is challenging an in-
cumbent will typically be a heavy underdog and thus will be forced to try
to spend as much as possible, regardless of how they expect to do in the
election. Although challenger spending may still depend on expected elec-
tion results as supporters may be more willing to contribute to a candidate
who has a fighting chance, the amount of contributions shouldn’t depend on
election results as much as for incumbents.
The primary question of interest is whether individual contributions have
a greater effect than corporate contributions. Although the estimates for
incumbent spending are biased, and possibly challenger spending as well, the
relevant statistic to answer this question is actually the difference between
individual and corporate contribution effects. How this difference is affected
by the simultaneity bias is then the important issue. If the simultaneity
is biasing individual or corporate contributions more than the other, the
difference between the two effects will also be biased. The question is then
which type of contribution is more likely to be affected by the simultaneity.
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In order to answer this question, remembering the cause of the simultaneity
bias is important. Incumbent (and possibly challenger) contributions are
being biased because they depend on the expected election results. That
is, if an incumbent feels safe, they will not actively seek to raise as many
contributions. However, as mentioned in the previous section, corporations
may contribute to candidates in order to gain access and influence. If that
is the case they would most certainly wish to contribute to safe incumbents
as they are almost sure to be betting on the winner. Therefore even if an
incumbent is not as actively seeking contributions, they still might receive
nearly as many. Individuals, on the other hand, are far less likely to throw
money at a candidate unprompted.
This means that the amount of corporate contributions an incumbent re-
ceives is likely less influenced by expected election results than individual
contributions. Therefore the amount of bias might be slightly less for corpo-
rate contributions than for individual contributions. However, the simultane-
ity is biasing the estimates downwards, which means if the effect of corporate
contributions is less biased, the difference between individual and corporate
effects would be decreased.
As seen in Table 4, the effects of individual contributions are statistically
greater than the effects of corporate contributions for both incumbents and
challengers. While the difference may be biased, the bias is most likely
causing it to be smaller than the actual difference. Thus if the estimated
effects are significantly different, it is even more likely that the true effects
are different. This means that although OLS was not helpful in examining the
size of contribution effects, the results still seem to support the finding that
individual contributions have a greater effect than corporate contributions.
Advertising Costs
So far the results have seemed to indicate that the source of a contribution
is important in determining its effect and that individual contributions have
a larger effect than corporate contributions. While it is impossible to say
with certainty what is causing this difference, one explanation that seems
plausible is that individual contributions are serving as an additional signal
for how voters will behave in the election. If this is true it would imply
that there is actually a separate effect besides the spending effect that is
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being contained in the individual contributions. This effect is measuring the
indirect effect of a candidate’s quality being measured through the amount
of individual contributions. In order to test this theory I will examine the
effects of advertising costs.
A large portion of campaign expenditures are used to buy television ad-
vertisements. Therefore, the effect of campaign spending should rely heavily
on the cost of advertising, which vary greatly by congressional district. If the
discussed theory is correct then there are two effects involved in campaign
contributions, a direct spending effect and an indirect quality effect. Differ-
ences in advertising costs would certainly have an impact on the spending
effect but they should not have an impact on the quality effect. Thus examin-
ing the variation in advertising costs serves as an excellent way of identifying
the effects involved with contributions.
The variation in advertising cost is also exogenously determined by the
media market in each district and has little to do with elections. However,
the analysis may be complicated if the amount of contributions is related to
the advertising cost. This would be expected if individuals or corporations
contribute strategically based on how effective their contributions will be. If
that were the case then candidates in areas with low advertising costs might
expect to receive more contributions as those contributions are buying more
ads. This, however, turns out not to be true as advertising costs are not
related to either individual or corporate contributions. Thus any variation
in contribution effects are only due to changes in advertising costs.
In order to incorporate advertising costs I first must measure the cost
of advertising in each congressional district. To do this I first find each
media market’s cost per rating point, which measures how much it costs to
reach one percent of the market’s audience, from the SQAD market guide
handbook. However, some districts are located entirely in one media market
while others are spread across multiple markets. I therefore construct a cost
index for each district that is a weighted average of advertising costs based
on the percentage of the district’s population that is in each media market.
I am then interested in whether the effects of both spending and quality
are influenced by differences in advertising costs across districts. I therefore
include advertising cost interaction terms for both the amount of contribu-
tions, both individual and corporate, and the number of individual donations
for incumbents and challengers. This leads to the following model:
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V ote = β0 + β1II + β2IC + β3CI + β4CC + β5DI + β6DC+
β7(II ∗ Cost) + β8(IC ∗ Cost) + β9(CI ∗ Cost) + β10(CC ∗ Cost)
+ β11(DI ∗ Cost) + β12(DC ∗ Cost) + β13PV I+
+ β14Term+ βi,DDemi ∗ Y eari + βi,RRepi ∗ Y eari +  (1.7)
where Cost is the advertising cost index
If there is indeed an indirect quality effect that doesn’t depend on the
advertising cost then we should expect β5, β6 6= 0 but β11, β12 = 0. On the
other hand the direct spending effects should be influenced by the advertising
cost, which would mean β7, β8, β9, β10 6= 0.
As seen in Table 4, this is indeed the case. The interaction terms with
the amount of contributions are all significantly different from 0 but the
interaction terms with the number of individual donations are not. This does
not prove that the difference in contribution source is due to a hidden quality
effect but these results are exactly what would be expected if it were the case.
The results do indicate that there are indeed two separate effects and that
only one of those effects depends on the advertising cost. While there could
be other explanations for the effect that doesn’t depend on advertising cost,
the most likely answer would seem to be that it is somehow reflective of a
candidate’s quality.
1.5.3 Quantile Regression
To further illustrate the difference between individual and corporate contri-
butions, I now turn to quantile regression. As seen from previous results,
there seems to be a large problem with simultaneity biasing the results. This
simultaneity is coming from a difference in incumbent behavior for close ver-
sus safe races. Incumbents in close races place a great deal of emphasis on
fundraising whereas incumbents in safe elections place little importance in it.
This would seem to suggest that there may be heterogenous effects of cam-
paign contributions. Along from the fact that safe incumbents don’t need
the extra fundraising, they could be neglecting to fundraise because spending
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Table 1.4: Advertising Costs
House
Incumbent Vote
Incumbent Individual 0.0065∗∗∗ Incumbent Individual -0.0310∗∗∗
Contributions (0.000725) Contributions * Cost (0.00713)
Incumbent Corporate -0.0061∗∗∗ Incumbent Corporate - 0.0220∗∗
Contributions (0.000861) Contributions * Cost (0.00972)
Challenger Individual -0.0252∗∗∗ Challenger Individual 0.0178∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00102) Contributions * Cost (0.00699)
Challenger Corporate -0.00847∗∗∗ Challenger Corporate 0.0194∗∗∗
Contributions (0.000918) Contributions * Cost (0.00513)
Incumbent Number 0.00725∗ Incumbent Donations * Cost -7.31e-05
Donations (0.00319) (0.000131)
Challenger Number -0.0561∗∗∗ Challenger Donations * Cost 0.000178
Donations (0.00824) (0.000203)
Term 0.0854
(0.0291)
PVI 0.193∗∗∗
(0.0149)
Constant 54.28∗∗∗
(1.255)
N 3878
Contributions are in square root
Media costs divided by 100
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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in safe elections have a much smaller effect than spending in close elections.
To investigate this possibility I utilize quantile regression to look for het-
erogenous effects. I again separate contributions into individual and corpo-
rate contributions and I also include the number of individual donations as
well as the district partisanship and number of terms served. The quantiles
are ordered by incumbent vote share, meaning that low quantiles are those
where the incumbent fared the worst and higher quantiles are those where
the incumbent fared the best. Note that due to the almost overwhelming
incumbency advantage in the House, only the very low quantiles reflect com-
petitive races. The tenth percentile of races featured incumbents earning
52% of the vote and by the 30th percentile incumbents were earning around
60% of the vote, already races that could be deemed uncompetitive.
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Figure 1.1: Quantile estimates for incumbent contributions
The estimates themselves are still likely biased by simultaneity and thus
the magnitudes may not be believable but the relative differences between
the quantiles present an interesting phenomenon. The effects of individual
contributions are significantly positive for close races but the effect decreases
as the race become less competitive, to the point where the effect is not
significant past the 30th quantile. The same is true for the effect of the
number of incumbent individual donations. However, the opposite is true
for incumbent corporate contributions, where the effect increases as the race
becomes less competitive.
This is a very intriguing result, and one that would be missed if only
looking at the total amount of contributions, even if quantile regression was
used as the changes would at least partially cancel out. The difference most
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Table 1.5: Quantile Regression
τ = .05 τ = .1 τ = .15 τ = .25 τ = .5 τ = .9
Incumbent Individual 0.00349∗∗ 0.00401∗∗ 0.00352∗∗ 0.00157 -0.00130 -0.00224
Contributions (0.00134) (0.00143) (0.00127) (0.00114) (0.00102) (0.00174)
Incumbent Corporate -0.00809∗∗∗ -0.00735∗∗∗ -0.00725∗∗∗ -0.00701∗∗∗ -0.00669∗∗∗ -0.00526∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00116) (0.000860) (0.000762) (0.000685) (0.000616) (0.00105)
Challenger Individual -0.0253∗∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0264∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00184) (0.00136) (0.00120) (0.00108) (0.000974) (0.00166)
Challenger Corporate -0.00801∗∗∗ -0.00839∗∗∗ -0.00812∗∗∗ -0.00837∗∗∗ -0.00938∗∗∗ -0.00961∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00112) (0.000825) (0.000731) (0.000657) (0.000591) (0.00101)
Incumbent Number 0.000441 0.000442 0.000637 0.000297 0.000892 0.00111
Donations (0.000997) (0.000737) (0.000653) (0.000587) (0.000528) (0.000898)
Challenger Number -0.00845∗∗∗ -0.00880∗∗∗ -0.00946∗∗∗ -0.00974∗∗∗ -0.00857∗∗∗ -0.00374∗∗
Donations (0.00129) (0.000953) (0.000844) (0.000759) (0.000683) (0.00116)
Terms Served 0.0211 0.0312 0.0338 0.0616 0.0858∗∗ 0.0941
(0.0585) (0.0432) (0.0383) (0.0344) (0.0309) (0.0526)
PVI 0.143∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.0189) (0.0139) (0.0124) (0.0111) (0.00999) (0.0170)
Constant 53.40∗∗∗ 53.99∗∗∗ 54.46∗∗∗ 57.08∗∗∗ 61.20∗∗∗ 65.54∗∗∗
(1.369) (1.011) (0.896) (0.806) (0.724) (1.232)
N 3878 3878 3878 3878 3878 3878
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
likely comes from the strategic behavior of corporations. As mentioned ear-
lier, corporations will be more interested in contributing to candidates who
have a better chance of winning so that the corporation has some amount of
influence when they are in office. This would imply that in safe elections, cor-
porations will be willing to contribute higher amounts to the incumbent and
thus the incumbent corporate contributions should be more closely related
to the incumbents vote, leading to a perceived bigger effect.
The results underscore the importance of the source of campaign contribu-
tions. Not only are the effects different but the dynamics are different as well.
Furthermore, when looking only at the lower quantiles, which represent the
close elections, the difference between individual and corporate coefficients
is even larger. This also provides a possible explanation as to why previous
papers have found insignificant estimates for incumbent spending. The re-
sults here suggest that for safe elections spending indeed has an insignificant
effect. While the simultaneity bias makes it hard to determine what effects
are actually significant, the combined effect does appear to be lower in safe
elections. Thus what previous papers have had trouble reconciling is simply
the fact that spending effects are heterogenous.
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1.6 Estimating Contribution Effects
1.6.1 TSLS
Given the inherent problem of simultaneity, the next logical step is to at-
tempt to use an instrumental variable approach to attempt to obtain more
reliable estimates. I will follow Green and Krasno by using lagged incum-
bent contributions as an instrument and I will separate the contributions into
lagged individual contributions and lagged corporate contributions. Lagged
contributions are expected to make an acceptable instrument because they
measure a candidate’s propensity to spend without being related to any cur-
rent election dynamics.
As mentioned before, the main criticism of this instrument is that it was
correlated with Green and Krasno’s definition of district partisanship. In
this paper district partisanship is calculated using the results of the previous
presidential election and not the previous congressional results. The results of
the presidential election are completely separate from congressional elections
and therefore should be unrelated to the values of the lagged incumbent
contributions. This criticism is therefore not a concern for the current setup.
Another concern with the instrument is that how an incumbent performs
in the previous election will have an effect on the quality of the challenger in
the current election. For example, if an incumbent faced a tough challenger
in the previous election but won handily, it may serve as a deterrent to
current high quality challengers whereas if an incumbent faced a low quality
challenger but barely survived, it might serve as a signal that the incumbent
is vulnerable and invite a high quality challenger.
In order to account for this possibility I follow Goidel and Gross (1994) and
include the lagged incumbent vote share as well as an interaction term for
lagged spending times the lagged vote share. The lagged vote share indicates
how well the incumbent performed in the last election, which should serve as
a signal of the incumbents vulnerability. Incumbents who did very poorly in
the previous election might be more likely to invite a higher quality candidate
in the current election. This is especially true if the incumbent performed
relatively poorly in an easy race, which should be measured by the interaction
term.
The results in Table 6 show that the estimate for incumbent corporate
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Table 1.6: TSLS
House
Inc Vote
Incumbent Individual 0.00681
Contributions (0.00581)
Incumbent Corporate -0.00219
Contributions (0.00661)
Challenger Individual -0.0235∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00172)
Challenger Corporate -0.0107∗∗∗
Contributions (0.00141)
Incumbent Number 0.00813∗
Donations (0.00376)
Challenger Number -0.0502∗∗∗
Donations (0.00901)
Terms Served 0.0791
(0.0399)
Incumbent PVI 0.208∗∗∗
(0.0210)
Constant 59.14∗∗∗
(0.825)
N 2667
Contributions are in square root
Dependent variable is incumbent’s vote share
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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contributions is still negative even after instrumenting. In addition, the effect
of individual contributions is no longer significant. This suggests that the
instruments were not successful in overcoming the simultaneity bias.
1.6.2 3SLS
TSLS did not seem to eliminate the simultaneity bias. This is not terribly
surprising as the source of the simultaneity was due to the fact that the
amount of contributions received depends on the election results. This is
not something that can be directly accounted for in TSLS as the dependent
variable cannot be used as an instrument. I will therefore turn to 3SLS, which
does allow the election result to directly impact the amount of contributions.
The problem is ideally suited for 3SLS as the contribution levels and election
results as well as candidate quality are all being simultaneously determined.
3SLS will take advantage of the covariance between these equations in order
to obtain more accurate estimates of the effects involved. I will therefore use
3SLS to estimate a system of equations involving campaign contributions
and election results as well as candidate quality all at the same time.
Quality
Candidate quality is obviously a large determinant of both election results
and candidate contributions. As mentioned before there is an extra effect in
individual contributions that appears to be related to candidate quality. I
will therefore use the number of individual donations made to each candidate
as a proxy variable for the quality of that candidate. Candidate quality,
and certainly the number of donations, is very likely to be endogenous and
therefore I will include equations for both incumbent quality and challenger
quality.
There is a large literature that suggests the quality of challengers varies
quite a bit.1 Challenger quality is very likely to be a result of the vulnerability
of the incumbent; if an incumbent is perceived as vulnerable it will invite high
quality challengers whereas if the incumbent is deemed safe then high quality
challengers will wait for a better opportunity. This means that similar to
1Epstein & Zemsky (1995), Box-Steffensmeier (1996), Green & Krasno (1998b),
Goodliffe (2001), Carson, Engstrom, & Roberts (2007)
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the previous TSLS model, the previous election results, previous challenger
quality, and previous election results times previous challenger quality should
determine current challenger quality. These will measure how an incumbent
performed in the previous election and thus how vulnerable they will appear.
Challenger quality will also depend largely on expected results in the cur-
rent election. If an incumbent is in a very safe district, i.e. a Democrat in
a very blue district, then they will be unlikely to attract high quality chal-
lengers as they will not be considered vulnerable. I therefore include both the
partisan voting index to measure district makeup as well as the current elec-
tion results as a stand in for expected election results. Furthermore, years
that are expected to be particularly good years for a party might attract
higher quality candidates in that party. I therefore include yearly effects by
party.
Finally, when controlling for the amount of contributions, the number of
individual donations serves as a proxy for candidate quality. However, on
its own the number of donations is also related to the amount of fundraising
candidates engage in. This will likely be a strategic decision, with incum-
bent and challenger fundraising highly correlated. Therefore I will include
the number of individual donations made to the incumbent to measure this
interaction.
The equation for challenger quality will thus be
ChalDon = β0 + β1V ote+ β2IncDon+ β3LagChalDon+
β4LagV ote ∗ LagChalDon+ β5LagV ote+ β6PV I + β7Term+
+ βiDDem ∗ Y ear + βiRRep ∗ Y ear +  (1.8)
and similarly for incumbent quality:
IncDon = β0 + β1V ote+ β2ChalDon+ β3LagIncDon+
β4LagV ote ∗ LagIncDon+ β5LagV ote+ β6PV I + β7Term+
+ βiDDem ∗ Y ear + βiRRep ∗ Y ear +  (1.9)
Although a candidate’s quality is typically a measure of their underlying
characteristics, which shouldn’t change from year to year, the number of
donations certainly will as it is also related to fundraising. This can also be
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thought of as the voters’ perceptions of the incumbent’s quality from year to
year.
Incumbent Contributions
Campaign contributions for incumbents are clearly endogenous, most notably
they are dependent on the expected election results. I will therefore include
the incumbent vote share in the equation for incumbent contributions. I also
include the instruments from the TSLS analysis, lagged contributions, lagged
vote share, and lagged contributions times lagged vote share. I also include
yearly party dummies, leading to the following equations for incumbent con-
tributions:
II = β0 + β1V ote+ β2PV I + β3Term+ β4CI + β5LagV ote+ β6LagII+
+ β7LagII ∗ LagV ote+ βiDDem ∗ Y ear + βiRRep ∗ Y ear +  (1.10)
IC = β0 + β1V ote+ β2PV I + β3Term+ β4CC + β5LagV ote+ β6LagIC+
+ β7LagIC ∗ LagV ote+ βiDDem ∗ Y ear + βiRRep ∗ Y ear +  (1.11)
Challenger Contributions
It is less clear if challenger contributions are endogenous. The previous esti-
mates have been believable and more or less consistent, which may indicate
that challenger contributions are exogenous. However, it may still be the
case that challenger contributions are endogenous but the amount of bias is
simply much smaller than incumbent contributions. Since I am estimating
a system of equations anyway, it makes sense to include equations for chal-
lenger in case they are in fact endogenous. If they turn out to be exogenous
then the coefficients on these equations should be 0 anyway and including
the extra equations won’t have done any harm.
I therefore model challenger contributions similar to incumbent contribu-
tions:
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CI = β0 + β1V ote+ β2PV I + β3Term+ β4II + β5LagV ote+ β6LagCI+
+ β7LagCI ∗ LagV ote+ βiDDem ∗ Y ear + βiRRep ∗ Y ear +  (1.12)
CC = β0 + β1V ote+ β2PV I + β3Term+ β4IC + β5LagV ote+ β6LagCC+
+ β7LagCC ∗ LagV ote+ βiDDem ∗ Y ear + βiRRep ∗ Y ear +  (1.13)
Advertising Costs
Previous results have indicated that advertising costs do have an impact on
the spending effects of campaign contributions. I therefore wish to incorpo-
rate this fact in order to make the most accurate model possible. In order to
do this I will divide the amount of contributions for each candidate by the
advertising cost before taking the square root. This effectively transforms
the variable from amount of money spent by each candidate into the number
of television commercials bought by each candidate.
Of course the number of commercials for each candidate should be endoge-
nous for all the same reasons that the amount of contributions is endogenous.
However, incorporating the advertising costs should increase the accuracy of
estimating any spending effects.
Election
The model for election results is straightforward and similar to previous
sections. Incumbent vote share is a function of spending by both candidates,
candidate qualities, district partisanship, terms served, the lagged vote and
yearly partisan effects:
V ote = β0 + β1II + β2IC + β3CI + β4CC + β5IncDon+ β6ChalDon+
+β7PV I+β8Term+β9LagV ote+βi,DDemi ∗Y eari+βi,RRepi ∗Y eari+ 
(1.14)
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Results
The model produces a number of interesting results. Looking first at the
spending equations in Table 9, the coefficient on the incumbent vote share is
negative in every equation. This confirms the suspicion that spending levels
are indeed dependent on the expected election results and that in races where
the incumbent is safer, there will be lower levels of spending by both candi-
dates. Furthermore, this is true for both incumbents and challengers. This
implies that, as expected, incumbent contributions are indeed endogenous
but that challenger contributions are endogenous as well. Previous estimates
of challenger contributions were therefore also affected by simultaneity bias
and likely unreliable.
A rather interesting result occurs when comparing this effect between in-
dividual and corporate contributions for incumbents and challengers. The
effect of the expected vote share on individual contributions is higher than
the effect on corporate contributions for incumbents but lower for challengers.
This means that incumbent corporate contributions are not as influenced by
expected election results but challenger corporate contributions are. This is
likely a result of strategic behavior by corporations. Corporations are eager
to give money to candidates that have a good chance of winning in order to
buy influence and access. If an incumbent is safe corporations will be enthu-
siastic to give the incumbent contributions and much less eager to contribute
to the challenger. This would make the drop-off in corporate contributions
much steeper for challengers than incumbents.
The main result of interest are the coefficients in the election equation.
As seen in Table 9, the estimates for incumbent contributions are positive
and significant for both individual and corporate contributions. These are
finally estimates of the spending effects that actually make sense, indicating
that both incumbent and challenger spending are important factors in de-
termining election results. The estimates of spending effects have increased
dramatically after using 3SLS, implying that there was a severe amount of
simultaneity bias in previous estimates for both incumbents and challengers.
While previous estimates of spending effect were larger for challengers,
after accounting for the simultaneity, the estimates for incumbent and chal-
lenger spending effects are not significantly different. The effect of an in-
crease in the square root of individual contributions appears to increase vote
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Table 1.7: 3SLS Quality Equations
Inc Donations Chal Donations
Incumbent Vote -0.0531∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.154)
PVI -0.155∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0312)
Term -0.0142 0.00110
(0.0287) (0.0189)
Lag Vote -0.0878∗ -0.420∗∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0585)
Challenger Number 0.299∗
Individual Donations (0.1413)
Lag Incumbent -0.849∗∗∗
Number Donations (0.226)
Lag Incumbent 0.0332∗∗∗
Number Donations Times Vote (0.00265)
Incumbent Number 0.364∗∗∗
Individual Donations (0.0483)
Lag Challenger -0.752∗∗∗
Number Donations (0.108)
Lag Challenger 0.0229∗∗∗
Number Donations Times Vote (0.00369)
Constant 9.63 5.671
(6.021) (4.429)
N 2667 2667
Contributions are in square root
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.8: 3SLS Spending Equations
Inc Ind Inc Corp Chal Ind Chal Corp
Inc Vote -0.0400∗∗ -0.00428 -0.0771∗ -0.160∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0121) (0.0322) (0.0345)
PVI 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.00206 -0.00198 0.0190∗∗
(0.00302) (0.00256) (0.00670) (0.00704)
Term .000197 0.00640 -0.00311 -0.0109
(0.00288) (0.00280) (0.00735) (0.00737)
Challenger Individual 0.462∗∗∗
Contributions (0.0176)
Challenger Corporate 0.380∗∗∗
Contributions (0.0158)
Incumbent Individual 0.717∗∗∗
Contributions (0.0260)
Incumbent Corporate 0.615∗∗∗
Contributions (0.0241)
Lag Vote 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.00594 -0.00104 0.0590∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00916) (0.0207) (0.0227)
Lag Incumbent 0.404∗∗∗
Individual Contributions (0.0440)
Lag Incumbent 0.00208∗∗
Individual Times Vote (0.000634)
Lag Incumbent 0.426∗∗∗
Corporate Contributions (0.0397)
Lag Incumbent 0.00324∗∗∗
Corporate Times Vote (0.000596)
Lag Challenger 0.272∗∗∗
Individual Contributions (0.0712)
Lag Challenger -0.00255∗
Individual Times Vote (0.00102)
Lag Challenger 0.544∗∗∗
Corporate Contributions (0.0881)
Lag Challenger -0.00581∗∗∗
Corporate Times Vote (0.00135)
Constant 0.517 0.781∗∗ 4.431∗∗∗ 4.362∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.247) (0.584) (0.578
N 2667 2667 2667 2667
Contributions are in log
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.9: 3SLS Election Results
Inc Vote
Incumbent Individual 5.391∗∗∗
Contributions (0.496)
Incumbent Corporate 2.668∗∗∗
Contributions (0.314)
Challenger Individual -5.991∗∗∗
Contributions (0.878)
Challenger Corporate -2.862∗∗∗
Contributions (0.836)
Incumbent Number 0.692∗∗∗
Individual Donations (0.0828)
Challenger Number -1.170∗∗∗
Individual Donations (0.214)
PVI 0.146∗∗∗
(0.0176)
Term 0.0730
(0.0447)
Constant 41.97∗∗∗
(2.329)
N 2667
Contributions are in log
Dependent variable is incumbent’s vote share
Yearly effects included but suppressed
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
36
share by about 0.22% and an increase in the root of corporate contributions
increases vote share by around 0.14%. The average amount of individual
contributions is $513,523 for incumbents and $219,332 for challengers and
the average corporate contributions is $474,646 for incumbents and $136,562
for challengers.
This means that on average incumbents would need to raise an extra
$131,824 individual contributions or $221,704 corporate contributions to win
an extra 1% of the vote, while a challenger would need an extra $75,328 indi-
vidual contributions or $104,432 corporate contributions. With the average
size of a U.S. congressional district being around 710,000, this translates to a
cost per vote for incumbents of around $18.57 in individual contributions or
$31.23 in corporate contributions and a cost per vote for challengers of around
$10.61 in individual contributions or $19.23 in corporate contributions.
However, the effects of individual contributions are still significantly larger
than the effects of corporate contributions for both incumbents and chal-
lengers even after including the number of individual donations. This implies
that not all of the extra effect involved in individual contributions has been
controlled for. This may be due to the fact that the number of individual
donations is actually only those donations that are over $200. The majority
of individual donations are likely under $200 and thus a large amount of
information is left out by not including these donations. Unfortunately, this
information is not provided by the FEC.
Nonetheless, the estimated effect of the number of individual donations,
which is meant to act as a proxy for candidate quality, is highly significant
for both incumbents and challengers. This is after controlling for the amount
of contributions, which means how many people supported a candidate is an
important prediction of how that candidate can expect to do in the election.
Again this implies that there is more to campaign contributions than simply
spending effects. Interestingly, this effect is nearly twice as large for chal-
lengers as it is for incumbents, implying that it is much more important for
challengers to convince voters to support them early on. As mentioned ear-
lier, there is typically a great deal of variation in the quality of challengers,
with many papers claiming high quality challengers are in the minority. It is
crucial then for challengers who are of high quality to differentiate themselves
as one of the few good ones.
The results therefore suggest that the effects of spending are relatively
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the same for incumbents and challengers but the effects of quality are much
greater for challengers. This is contrary to many previous papers that found
that challenger spending has a greater impact than incumbent spending. The
findings here present a number of possible explanations for this difference.
The first possibility is that previous papers have not sufficiently accounted
for the simultaneity problem and thus led to biased estimates. Most previous
work has focused on the use of TSLS, which does not directly allow for
contributions to be a function of election results. This has lead to debated
instruments that may or may not have solved the endogeneity problem. By
using 3SLS, I was able to directly incorporate the effect of election results on
campaign contributions and thus obtain more accurate estimates. Previous
papers have also failed to account for advertising costs, which as shown in
this paper clearly have a large impact on spending effects. By normalizing
contributions by advertising costs in a district I have further improved the
accuracy of estimated spending effects.
Another explanation for the findings of previous papers is that by not
accounting for the source of campaign contributions, they have confused
the effects of spending and quality. By only looking at total contributions,
previous estimates of spending effect have in fact estimated the effect of
spending and quality. As shown here, the quality effect for challengers is
greater than for incumbents and thus the previous findings that challenger
spending has a greater effect may in fact have been coming from the higher
quality effect for challengers.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper has made an important distinction between the source of cam-
paign contributions. I have shown that the source of a contribution is im-
portant in determining the effect it will have on an election. Specifically I
found that individual contributions have a greater impact on election results
than corporate contributions. I also showed that this difference is most likely
coming from an indirect effect of quality that is being contained in individual
contributions. Not only does this shed new light into the effects of campaign
contributions but it also allows for the possibility of quantitatively estimating
candidate quality. This is of great empirical importance as it gives a measure
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of quality that is derived from voter actions and thus more accurately reflects
the preferences of voters.
I then used 3SLS to obtain estimates of the contribution effects that are
not hindered by simultaneity bias. The results show that the amount of con-
tributions received by both incumbents and challengers is negatively related
with the incumbent’s vote share. After controlling for this effect I found
that both incumbent and challenger spending have significant effects on the
election results. Furthermore, unlike previous papers I find that the direct
effects of incumbent and challenger spending are not statistically different.
However, the indirect effect of quality is much greater for challengers than
incumbents.
The results presented here are important not only in the estimation of elec-
tion results but also in the understanding of the effects involved. Omission
of the quality effect has led to misinterpretations of the previously estimated
spending effects. Previous estimates of spending have actually been com-
bining the effects of spending and quality. Only by examining the source of
campaign contributions can accurate and precise measurements of the effects
be obtained.
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CHAPTER 2
Optimal Party Spending in Multiple Elections
2.1 Introduction
Political parties are a major factor in today’s elections. With elected officials
requiring the support of other politicians to pass laws in bodies such as
Congress or Parliament, some coordination and compromise between these
officials is necessary. This is where parties come into play. By joining with
other like-minded officials politicians are able to pass their preferred laws
that they would not have been able to on their own.
Political parties then have a desire to ensure as many of their candidates
are elected as possible in order to have their most preferred positions im-
plemented. To this end, parties often contribute campaign contributions to
their candidates in order to help them secure a seat in office. But clinching
one or two elections is useless if a majority is required to enact new laws. The
parties therefore have to determine how to distribute campaign contributions
among its candidates in order to win not only a few elections but a majority
of them.
Spending in the 2012 presidential election alone totaled more than $2 bil-
lion by the campaigns and outside interest groups. Given the amount of
money involved the parties and groups have a great incentive to make sure
that every dollar was spent where it would have its greatest effect. Given the
extraordinary level of spending in the battleground states of Ohio, Florida,
and Virginia, the parties clearly believed that the optimal strategy was to
spend most heavily in states that are highly competitive. This is further
supported by Figure 2.1, where the majority of states with large Democratic
or Republican advantages received no spending by either campaign.1
1From CNN, spending by candidates’ campaigns only, excluding Super PACs.
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2012/campaign-tracker/
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Figure 2.1: Spending by state’s political leaning 2
In this paper we examine the strategy of political parties when faced with
such a problem. We assume that there are two policy motivated parties,
a left party desiring an implemented policy as close to 0 as possible and a
right party desiring an implemented policy as close to 1 as possible, each
competing to win office motivated candidates in k different districts. The
implemented policy is the median policy of the winning candidates.
In each district there are two types of voters, informed and uninformed.
The candidates choose a platform position to win informed votes and spend
money on advertising in order to win uninformed votes. Parties then con-
tributed campaign contributions in order to convince the candidates to join
their party and run on the party’s chosen platform. The parties must then
decide what positions they want the candidates to choose and how to dis-
tribute their spending amongst the districts in order to maximize or minimize
the expected implemented policy.
We find that campaign spending is heavily focused in districts that have
the most central median voter location. We also find that constraints in the
parties’ more disadvantaged districts are most often binding, meaning the
parties only spend as much as they have to in these districts.
2As defined by Gallup, percent of state’s population identifying as leaning Demo-
cratic minus percent leaning Republican. http://www.gallup.com/poll/152438/States-
Move-GOP-2011.aspx#3
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2.2 Previous Literature
There have been various explanations for the role of political parties. Levy
(2004) poses a model in which candidates are able to commit to only a
limited set of policies and political parties increase the set of policies the
candidates can commit to, allowing them to offer more attractive policy
positions and thus increase their competitiveness. Snyder and Ting (2002)
argue that voters are incompletely informed about candidates’ platforms and
that parties offer a way of providing informative signals about their true
position.
Aldrich and McGinnis (1989) examine a model where both voters and
political parties contribute to campaigns based on the candidate’s platform.
They find that the incentive to elicit contributions causes the candidates
of both parties to move away from the median location. Wiseman (2006)
examines decisions by incumbent and challenger parties on how much costly
support to contribute and find that the strategy of the incumbent party
depends on the expected competitiveness of the race. He finds that in races
that are less politically competitive the candidates will choose more extreme
positions and that increasing the amount of party support leads to more
centralist positions. Both papers, however, only model races in one district
and do not examine the interplay of party candidates in multiple districts.
Snyder (1989) examines the strategic distribution of campaign spending
when parties are trying to either maximize their expected number of elections
won or maximize the probability of winning a majority of elections. He finds
that in symmetric equilibria the parties will spend more in races that are the
most competitive.
Krasa and Polborn (2015A, 2015B) look at a model of elections featuring
multiple districts where voters care not only about the policy preferences
of their elected official but also the enacted policy by the majority party
after the election. They find that candidates may be burdened by extreme
positions taken by their parties, even if it is not the same position taken
by the candidate. They also look at the effect of campaign spending on
political polarization and find that while spending does not have an effect
in a single district model, moving to model with multiple districts causes
campaign spending to influence polarization.
Numerous papers have investigated the effects of campaign spending on
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vote share and while some have suggested that challenger spending is more
effective than incumbent spending (Abramowitz 1988, Jacobson 1990), Ger-
ber (1998) finds that incumbent and challenger spending are equivalent and
both have a significant effect on the incumbent’s vote share.
2.3 Model
We assume that there are j = 1...k districts, each with its own distinct
median voter location, mj. In each district there are two candidates running
for office that each choose a position, xlj, xrj, and spending level, slj, srj.
In each district there are measure 1 informed voters, who vote only on the
position of the two candidates, and measure 1 uninformed voters, who vote
only on the amount of spending of the two candidates.
The distribution of informed voters’ ideal position is
gj(x) =
{
1
2mj
: 0 ≤ x ≤ mj
1
2(1−mj) : mj < x ≤ 1
(2.1)
Informed voters vote for whichever candidate’s position is closest to their
ideal point.
The amount of uninformed voters, Ulj, for the left candidate is drawn from
a Beta distribution with parameters slj and srj with the share of uninformed
voters for the right candidate being 1 − Ulj. This means that increased
spending by a candidate will increase the expected uninformed voters for the
candidate in that district but with decreasing returns.
We assume that each candidate has an initial spending level of 1 and thus
without any party intervention both candidates would choose xlj = xrj =
mj and slj = srj = 1 which means the candidates would each win with
probability 1
2
and the winning policies would bemj. The parties then make an
offer to a candidate in each district in the the form of campaign contributions,
αij, to be given if the candidate adopts the party’s position, which will likely
be away from the median voter. Candidates are office motivated, meaning
they will only accept the party’s offer if it increases their chance of winning.
In uncontested districts, that is a district in which only one party makes
an offer to a candidate, if the candidate does accept the party’s offer then
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the opposing candidate will maximize his chances of winning by moving his
position just to the right (left) of xlj (xrj), meaning the party candidate’s
share of the informed votes will be
Ij(x) =
{
x
2mj
: 0 ≤ x ≤ mj
1−x
2(1−mj) : mj < x ≤ 1
(2.2)
This leads to incentive constraints that the party must satisfy when making
an offer to the candidates, specifically
1− F (1− Ij(xlj)) ≥ .5 (2.3)
where F is the CDF of a Beta distribution with parameters 1 + αlj and 1.
Since Ij(x) decreases with distance to the median and the expected number of
uninformed votes (
1+αlj
2+αlj
) increases with αlj, in order to convince a candidate
to support more extreme positions the parties must offer more contributions.
In contested elections, when both candidates support the parties’ posi-
tions, neither candidate can move their position to win more informed votes,
meaning the share of informed voters will be
Icj (xlj, xrj) =
{
.5(xlj+xrj)
2mj
: 0 ≤ .5(xlj + xrj) ≤ mj
1 +
1−.5(xlj+xrj)
2(1−mj) : mj < .5(xlj + xrj) ≤ 1
(2.4)
for the left candidate and 1 − Icj (xlj, xrj) for the right candidate. If one
candidate chooses not to accept the party’s offer then their optimal position
will again be just to the right or left of the opposing party’s position, thus
the incentive constraint for the left party in contested districts is
1− Fc(1− Icj (xlj)) ≥ 1− Fu(1− Iuj (xrj)) (2.5)
where Fc is a Beta(1 + αlj, 1 + αrj) distribution and Fu is a Beta(1, 1 + αrj)
distribution and similarly for the right party.
The parties then choose positions xlj, xrj and contributions αlj, αrj in each
district in order to minimize (maximize) the expected implemented policy
subject to the incentive constraints and a budget constraint.
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2.4 Results
We first look at the case with three districts and median voter locations
0.4, 0.5, and 0.6 and party budgets of 6. As seen in Figure 2.2 the parties
spend the most money in the central district followed by the district they
have an advantage in. The party positions are xl = {0.3003, 0.3003, 0.3003}
and xr = {0.6997, 0.6997, 0.6997}, more extreme than any median. This
results in each party having a high probability of winning their advantaged
district and an equal chance of winning the central district.
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2.5
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(a) Spending by District
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0.6
0.7
(b) Winning Probability by District
Figure 2.2: Budget = 6
Since there are 6 variables for each party it is impossible to get a good
idea of the dynamics in one graph but there are a few that give interesting
insights. In Figure 2 we take a look at the expected implemented policy as
a function of only xl1, keeping the other variables at their equilibrium level,
and it shows a clear unique minimum. This is the same for xl2 and xl3,
suggesting that this is indeed a unique equilibrium and not a function of the
initial conditions.
We then turn our attention to spending. As Figure 3 shows increased
spending by the left party in District 1 (left district) decreases the expected
implemented policy but at a decreasing rate.
Next we look at increasing the amount of spending in the central district.
The central district is the most competitive and as we can see in Figure 2.5
the parties want to spend the most in this district. If the left party wants
to increase spending in the central district they must of course decrease
spending in one of the extreme districts. We first look at a graph of the
expected implemented policy as a function of increasing spending in district
2 and decreasing it by the same amount in district 1. We can see that the
45
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
XL1
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.64
Expected Policy
Figure 2.3: Expected policy as function of left party’s district 1 position
1 2 3 4 5 6 SL3
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
Expected Policy
Expected Policy as function of SL1
Figure 2.4: Expected policy as function of left party’s spending in district 1
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equilibrium is in fact a global minimum, meaning the left party would not
want to move money from district 1 to district 2. In other words the incentive
constraint is not binding for the left party in district 1.
￿1.0 ￿0.5 0.5 1.0 Spending Moved to D2
0.505
0.510
0.515
Decreasing ￿or Increasing￿ Spending in D1
Figure 2.5: Expected Policy after Decreasing (or Increasing) Spending in
District 1
This is not, however, the case for district 3. If we look at the same graph
for district 3 in Figure 2.6, that is moving money from district 3 to district 2,
it is actually decreasing in the amount of money moved. This means that by
decreasing the amount of spending in district 3 and increasing it in district
2 the left party could lower the expected implemented policy. This is not an
option, however, because of the incentive constraint.
￿1.0 ￿0.5 0.5 1.0 Spending Moved to D2
0.497
0.498
0.499
0.500
Decreasing ￿or Increasing￿ Spending in D3
Figure 2.6: Expected Policy after Decreasing (or Increasing) Spending in
District 3
All of the above was assuming that the parties compete in all 3 districts.
This does not have to be the case, however, as they only need to win two
districts in order to gain control of the median position. We therefore look
at what would happen if the parties only competed in 2 districts. Of course
the parties will each compete in the two districts that are easiest for them
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to win, meaning districts 1 and 3 will be uncontested, in that only one party
will be competing, and district 2 will be contested by both parties. A couple
interesting facets occurs in the uncontested districts. When the left (right)
party’s candidate chooses a position the independent candidate chooses a
position just to the right (left). This means, however, that the parties do not
mind losing to the independents since they will end up choosing almost ex-
actly the same policy as the party wanted. This also means that the winning
position in district 3, whether won by the right party or the independent,
will surely be above 0.5, and since the left party will always choose positions
below 0.5, this means that the left party’s position in district 1 will never be
pivotal as it has no chance of being the median winning position. As seen in
Figure 2.7 this means that lowering the position in district 1 will not change
the expected implemented policy.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
Figure 2.7: Expected policy as function of left party’s district 1 position
While changing the position only will not affect the policy it does affect
the incentive constraint, meaning the parties will want to choose a position
as close to the district’s median voter as possible without affecting the im-
plemented policy as this will allow them to spend less in district 1 and more
in district 2. The end result is that they choose identical positions in each of
the two districts they compete in, 0.325 for the left party and 0.675 for the
right. As said before, the parties do not care if they win or lose the uncon-
tested districts. This gives them the advantage of being able to spend less in
the uncontested districts and instead focus on the contested central district.
This is reflected in the winning probabilities, as the party candidates have
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only a 50% chance of winning, the minimum required to satisfy the incen-
tive constraint, in the uncontested districts and in the massive amount of
spending, 94.5% of their budget, in district 2.
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Figure 2.8: Competing in 2 Districts
We then try to determine if the parties will compete in 2 or 3 districts. Of
course in any symmetric equilibrium the expected implemented policy is 0.5
so to determine if competing in the third district is advantageous we look
at what would happen if the left party competes in 3 districts and the right
party competes in only 2. In this case districts 2 and 3 are contested but
district 1 is still uncontested, meaning the left party still wants to spend as
little in district 1 as possible. The chosen positions are 0.32, 0.32, 0.32 for
the left party and 0.64, 0.64 for the right party. The parties again spend a
large majority of the spending in the central district, 81% for the left party
and 78% for the right party, but interestingly because the right party has a
position closer to 0.5 they are the favorite to win the central district.
Despite this, the expected implemented policy is still 0.4477, less than what
it would be in a symmetric equilibrium. This means that the left party will
want to continue to compete in 3 districts and the right party will want to
compete in the third district in order to increase the expected implemented
policy back to 0.5.
2.4.1 Triangular Distribution
We finally consider the effect of changing the distribution for uninformed
voters from Beta to Triangular. The CDF for the amount of uninformed
voters for the left party is then
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Figure 2.9: Left Competing in 3 districts, Right in 2
Uj(x) =

x2
s∗j
: 0 ≤ x ≤ s∗j
1− (1−x)2
(1−s∗j ) : s
∗
j < x ≤ 1
Where s∗j =
slj
slj+srj
is the fraction of total spending in the district by the left
party. The spending results are largely the same, heavily concentrated in the
middle district but the probabilities are much more competitive. The differ-
ence in the two distributions is that spending in the triangular distribution
has a limit to its effectiveness. Even if the left party accounts for 100% of
the spending in a district, the expected amount of informed votes for the left
party is still only 2
3
. This means that even with infinite spending, the party’s
can only expect to do so well, given their positions, as shown in Figure 2.11.
This also affects the incentive constraint, as the parties are no longer
able to simply buy their way out of any position in their disadvantaged
district. This puts increased pressure on the parties to have a more moder-
ate position in those districts and this is reflected in the chosen positions of
(0.319, 0.319, 0.475) and (0.681, 0.681, 0.525).
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2.5 Analytical Results
We now try to provide analytical results similar to the findings in the previous
sections. Because the model uses the beta distribution, which doesn’t have
a closed form CDF, the following results will be a bit general.
We restrict our analysis to symmetrical equilibria and focus the analysis
from the perspective of the left party with the results for the right party
following by symmetry. We will also assume an interior solution in terms
of the incentive constraints during the analysis and discuss the impacts of
incentive constraints after. The symmetry here is with respect to the advan-
taged and disadvantaged districts, meaning that the left party’s decision in
district 1 is analogous to the right party’s decision in district 3 as they are
the parties’ advantaged district. Similarly the left and right party will be at
a disadvantage in districts 3 and 1, respectively. District 2, of course, is even
for the two parties. This leads to the following symmetry conditions:
xr1 = 1 − xl3, xr2 = 1 − xl2, xr3 = 1 − xl1, sr1 = sl3, sr2 = sl2, sr3 = sl1, P1 =
1−P3, P2 = 12 , where Pi is the probability that the left party will win district
i.
Lemma 1 xli ≤ xri
Lemma 2 xl1 ≤ xl2 ≤ xl3 and xr1 ≤ xr2 ≤ xr3
Lemma 3 xl1 = min(xl2, xr1) and xr3 = max(xr2, xl3)
Proof Case 1: xl2 ≤ xr1
From Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 we know that xl1 ≤ xl2, xl3 and xl1 ≤ xr1 ≤
xr2, xr3. Therefore xl1 will never be the median of any three winning posi-
tions. Therefore changing xl1 will not affect the implemented policy except
through the probability of winning district 1. In that regard, since xl1 ≤ xr1,
increasing xl1 will always increase the probability that the left party will win
district 1. Therefore the left party will want to increase xl1 until xl1 = xl2,
at which point increasing xl1 any more could affect the implemented policy.
Similarly for the right party.
Case 2: xl2 > xr1 xl1 will again never be the median of any three winning
positions. Choosing xl1 < xr1 will therefore not lower the implemented pol-
icy no matter who wins. It will, however, decrease the left party’s share of
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the informed voters and therefore increase the right party’s probability of
winning district 1. This will increase the expected implemented policy and
the left party will therefore increase xl1 in order to avoid this.
Theorem 4 (Spending Levels) If the parties did not have in-
centive constraints, sl2 ≥ sl1, sl2 ≥ sl3 and sr2 ≥ sr1, sr2 ≥ sr3
Proof Based on the previous 3 lemmas and eliminating non-symmetric equi-
libria, there are 3 possible orderings of the party positions:
xl1 = xl2 ≤ xl3 ≤ xr1 ≤ xr2 ≤ xr3 (2.6)
xl1 = xl2 ≤ xr1 ≤ xl3 ≤ xr2 ≤ xr3 (2.7)
xl1 = xr1 ≤ xl2 ≤ xr2 ≤ xl3 ≤ xr3 (2.8)
Let Pi be the left party’s probability of winning district i. The 3 possible
position orderings leads to 3 possible Lagrangians:
L = P1P2P3xl2 + P1P2(1− P3)xl2 + P1(1− P2)P3xl3 + (1− P1)P2P3xl3 +
P1(1− P2)(1− P3)xr2 + (1− P1)P2(1− P3)xr1 + (1− P1)(1− P2)P3xr1 +
(1− P1)(1− P2)(1− P3)xr2 + λ(sl1 + sl2 + sl3 −Bl)
L = P1P2P3xl2 + P1P2(1− P3)xl2 + P1(1− P2)P3xl3 + (1− P1)P2P3xr1 +
P1(1− P2)(1− P3)xr2 + (1− P1)P2(1− P3)xr1 + (1− P1)(1− P2)P3xl3 +
(1− P1)(1− P2)(1− P3)xr2 + λ(sl1 + sl2 + sl3 −Bl)
L = P1P2P3xl2 + P1P2(1− P3)xl2 + P1(1− P2)P3xr2 + (1− P1)P2P3xl2 +
P1(1− P2)(1− P3)xr2 + (1− P1)P2(1− P3)xl2 + (1− P1)(1− P2)P3xr2 +
(1− P1)(1− P2)(1− P3)xr2 + λ(sl1 + sl2 + sl3 −Bl)
Leading to FOC’s:
∂P1
∂sl1
[1
2
(xl2 + xl3 − 1)] + λ = 0
∂P2
∂sl2
[2xl3P3(P3 − P1) + 2xl2P1 − (P 21 + P 23 )] + λ = 0
∂P3
∂sl3
[1
2
(xl2 + xl3 − 1)] + λ = 0
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∂P1
∂sl1
[P2(xl2 − xr1)] + λ = 0
∂P2
∂sl2
[P1(xl2 − xr2) + P3(xr1 − xl3)] + λ = 0
∂P3
∂sl3
[P2(xl2 − xr1)] + λ = 0
∂P1
∂sl1
[0] + λ = 0
∂P2
∂sl2
[xl2 − xr2] + λ = 0
∂P3
∂sl3
[0] + λ = 0
In all 3 cases these can be written as
∂P1
∂sl1
[φ1] + λ = 0
∂P2
∂sl2
[φ2] + λ = 0
∂P3
∂sl3
[φ1] + λ = 0
This means that ∂P1
∂sl1
[φ1] =
∂P2
∂sl2
[φ2] =
∂P3
∂sl3
[φ1]
Furthermore, in each case it can be shown that |φ1| ≤ |φ2|, implying that
∂P1
∂s1
≥ ∂P2
∂s2
.
Because the share of uninformed voters comes from a Beta distribution,
spending has decreasing returns to scale and therefore if ∂P1
∂s1
(= ∂P3
∂s3
) ≥ ∂P2
∂s2
then it must be the case that sl2 ≥ sl1 and sl2 ≥ sl3. Similar results hold for
the right party.
This means that the parties have a desire to spend more in the most
competitive district. This did not consider the incentive constraints, which
may limit the amount of spending the parties can assign to district 2.
2.6 Conclusion
The results consistently point to the same conclusion. In almost every case
spending is highest in the central district, often by large amounts. While
they do spend some money in outlying districts it is typically only as much
as they need to, preferring to spend as much as possible in the battleground
areas; making the incentive constraints particularly important in the disad-
vantaged districts. These results support the common practice of politicians
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and parties focusing the majority of their attention on crucial swing states
and tending to avoid states that perennially vote the same way.
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CHAPTER 3
Congressional Gridlock
3.1 Introduction
Congressional gridlock is a surprisingly common occurrence. Gridlock often
carries with it large financial and political costs. These costs typically hurt
voters from both parties and a majority of voters are usually opposed to
gridlock. Such strong disapproval by voters can then lead to damage to
politicians in both parties.
Consider, for example, the 2013 sequestration cuts, which called for budget
cuts to both defense and non-defense programs. The design was such that
the cuts would be so costly to both Democrats and Republicans that neither
party would be willing to let them be enacted. As Senator Mark Warner
put it, ”Sequestration was set up so it would be so stupid, so draconian,
so outside the realm of possibility that no rational people would ever let it
happen.” 1 However, despite the financial and political costs to both parties,
the cuts did go into effect.
Only months later, in October 2013, a government shutdown occurred as
a result of Democrats and Republicans failing to come to an agreement on
a budget resolution. This led to over 800,000 federal employees being indef-
initely furloughed. In 2011, Republicans and Democrats could not agree on
how to raise the debt ceiling. Although they eventually reached a compro-
mise on the last day before the deadline, the resulting uncertainty caused
S&P to downgrade the federal government’s credit rating, leading to severe
market crashes.
In all of these cases voters in both parties were hurt by the costs of gridlock.
This is shown by numerous polls, where not only did a majority of voters
disapprove of the gridlock but a majority of each party disapproved. A
1http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4460367/sen-warners-remarks-furloughed-virginians
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March 2013 poll found that 68% of all voters, including 80% of Democrats
and 62% of Republicans, thought the sequestration cuts should end.2 An
October 2013 poll found that 81% of all voters and a majority in each party,
92% of Democrats and 72 % of Republicans, disapproved of the government
shutdown.3 In an August 2011 poll, 85% of respondents believed that it would
be better for the country if Democrats and Republicans would compromise
in order to get things done.4
With such large costs associated with gridlock and such clear public opin-
ion against it, there should be enough pressure to convince politicians from
both parties to compromise. Politicians should be able to see the clear evi-
dence that voters desire a compromise and be encouraged to avoid gridlock.
However, this is clearly not the case as Congressional gridlock is almost a
daily occurrence despite the large costs associated with it. This suggests that
there is something that is driving politicians to refuse to compromise despite
the economic and political costs.
One likely explanation is that candidates are at least partially policy moti-
vated. If politicians were purely driven by maximizing their chances of being
elected then they should wish to follow policies that are closely aligned with
the preferences of a majority of voters. Given the polling results mentioned
earlier, this is clearly not the case. A clear majority of voters disapprove of
gridlock and yet politicians are routinely refusing to compromise, which is
clearly not in their best political interest.
This suggests that the politicians are at least not purely office motivated
and gridlock is a result of strict ideological differences. For example, a large
driving force of the gridlock mentioned above was from Tea Party resistance
within the Republican party. Tea Party members were so opposed to even
moderate compromises that many of them preferred gridlock, even with the
associated costs. If a large portion of lawmakers have such dedicated ideo-
logical views then they may be willing to risk the ire of voters in order to
attempt to get a more preferred policy enacted. If this is happening in both
parties then it would be no surprise that there would be some possibility of
2http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/03/13/National-
Politics/Polling/question 9990.xml?uuid wxuouSEeKvFZmAnqumyw
3http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/10/22/National-
Politics/Polling/question 12188.xml?uuid=6OjorDrOEeOw53FheaLCxw
4https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/229918/the-full-results-from-the-new-
york-times-and-cbs.pdf
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gridlock.
Another factor that could contribute to gridlock is uncertainty about up-
coming election results. If politicians are policy motivated then they will
attempt to negotiate as good of an outcome as they can. This is highly de-
pendent on the current political makeup of Congress. Roughly speaking, the
more seats a party has the stronger their position is and therefore the better
they can negotiate. However, this changes every 2 years with each election.
Depending on the outcome of elections, parties may be in a better bargaining
position after the elections and thus may be able to achieve a more desired
policy. If parties are sufficiently policy motivated this could provide enough
incentive to at least delay negotiations.
This can be seen by looking at the 2012 fiscal cliff negotiations. Both
parties thought that they would fare well in the elections and be in a better
position in the following Congress. This led to practically no talks between
the parties in the months leading up to the November elections despite the
existence of a January deadline for an agreement. However, as soon as the
election results were announced, both parties began serious negotiations. If
election outcomes could be predicted with more or less certainty then there
would be no reason to wait.
This paper will seek to understand why we so often see congressional grid-
lock despite the often high costs associated with failing to reach a compro-
mise. I examine a model of political legislature in which there are two bodies
and two political parties. In each body of the legislature there are elections
between members of each party. After the elections the winning candidates
must enter a bargaining stage to determine what policy will be implemented,
with penalties occurring if the two bodies cannot reach an agreement.
I find that the introduction of policy motivated candidates as well as elec-
tion uncertainty leads to outcomes in which there is a positive probability of
gridlock. These outcomes exist despite the fact that gridlock carries with it
a cost to all voters and the fact that there are always outcomes that both
parties prefer to gridlock. The existence of a high gridlock cost is therefore
not necessarily enough to encourage a compromise between the two parties.
This may help to explain why we so often see members of Congress failing
to reach timely agreements despite their significant costs.
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3.2 Literature Review
Gridlock is a result of bargaining that takes place between Democrats and
Republicans. This paper will therefore include a bargaining model that oc-
curs after the elections. Bargaining models date back to Rubinstein (1982),
who examined a model where two players must come to an agreement on
how to divide a pie of a fixed size. He showed that when both players are
impatient, the only equilibrium involves an agreement in the first time pe-
riod. His result suggests that delays in bargaining, and especially inefficient
outcomes that result from a failure to reach an agreement, should not happen
in equilibrium.
In reality of course, delays and breakdowns in negotiations do occur and
this paper deals with such instances. Many authors have proposed other
models that seek to explain what would cause breakdowns in negotiations.
A topic of interest is often negotiations between unions and strikes, which
often result in costly strikes. Haller and Holden (1990) extend the Rubinstein
model to allow for status quo agreements to continue during the bargaining
process. He finds that in this case equilibria that involve strikes do exist.
Furthermore, while the Rubinstein model allows for only a single outcome,
their model allows for a range of possible wages to be the outcome of the
bargaining. Other authors also find that strikes can occur in equilibrium (see
Fernandez and Glazer (1989), Houba and Wen (2008), Merlo and Wilson
(1995)).
Another area that sees frequent breakdowns in negotiations is conflicts
between nations. Powell (2002 and 2003) explores the bargaining problem in
the context of international conflict and looks at the causes of costly wars that
result from breakdowns in negotiations. Slantchev (2003a and 2003b) models
war as a costly bargaining problem between two nations. Although peace is
the Pareto-dominate outcome, there are still cases in which a country will
choose to go to war. The decision to go to war, or to stop fighting, largely
depends on a countrys ability to impose a cost on the opposing country.
These papers suggest that random shocks as well as parties attempting to
increase their payoff are common causes of negotiation failures. This will be
the case in this paper as well, where gridlock is a result of policy motivated
candidates as well as random election uncertainty.
This paper deals in particular with bargaining in legislature, which has also
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been covered by many previous papers. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) extend
Rubinsteins model to a case with n players and a random recognition rule.
They focus on two amendment rules, open and closed, and find that in an
open rule, which allows for amendment proposals, the recognized member
receives a lower payoff and that delays will occur with positive probability
in equilibrium. Many subsequent papers have expanded on this work (see
Harrington (1989, 1990), Calvert and Dietz (1996), Baron (1991), Winter
(1996), McCarty (1998), Jackson and Moselle (1998)).
Banks and Duggan (1999) investigate a model of collective choice where
proposers are randomly recognized and find that if agents are patient enough,
there are no stationary equilibrium that involve delay. Similarly, Cho and
Duggan (2009) prove that as agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of
supportable equilibrium collapses to the median voters ideal point and that
any delays will be inconsequential in terms of the final payout.
Kalandrakis (2006) looks at the idea of political power and shows that
equilibrium payoffs do not depend on voting rights. In Penn (2009), voters
care not only about the utility they receive from todays policy but also
the expected utility they would receive if that policy were to be replaced
sometime in the future. Morelli (1999) investigates coalitional bargaining in
a legislative framework and finds that there is no equilibrium with delays
and that the equilibrium does not depend on the identity of the proposer.
A common occurrence in political bargaining as well as in this paper is the
existence of deadlines associated with high costs if those deadlines are missed.
Many papers have examined the effect of such deadlines on bargaining out-
comes. Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) examine a model of endogenous
commitment, where the proposal space depends on the actions of partici-
pants in previous rounds and find that it leads to delayed agreements. Ma
and Manvone (1993) propose a bargaining model with a deadline in which
there is a random delay in the transmission of offers, which leads to a posi-
tive probability that the deadline will be missed. Sutter et al. (2003) discuss
bargaining under time pressure and find that it can lead to high costs and
higher rates of rejection. Sutter and Kocher (2006) further this by examining
time-dependent payoffs under time pressure and find that it leads to quicker
decisions.
This paper will incorporate many elements from the preceding works. It
covers both bargaining in the style of dividing a pie as well as the presence
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of political elections. There will be a random recognition rule as well as a
deadline after which costly penalties will be assigned to both parties.
3.3 Model
There are two bodies of a legislature, the House and the Senate. There is
an election in each body followed by a bargaining stage between the winning
candidates in each body. During the bargaining stage, the representative
from one body proposes a policy, xp ∈ [0, 1], which the member of the re-
sponding body can either accept or reject. Before the elections there is a
random coin toss to determine which body will be the proposer and which
will be the responder.
If the proposal is accepted then the policy is enacted and voters receive a
utility of Ui(xp) + vj, where Ui has an ideal point at βi and vj is a random
valence factor coming from the winning candidates. If the policy is rejected a
status quo policy, x0, is implemented and voters suffer an additional penalty
of ti, representing the costs of gridlock. Voter’s utility in this case is then
Ui(x0)− ti + vj.
Before the bargaining process there are elections in each body between
two candidates. Candidates choose a platform that they will run on in the
election, which includes a policy proposal that they would propose if chosen
as the proposing body as well as a range of policies that they would accept
if chosen as the responding body. If the candidates win they are committed
to taking these positions during the bargaining round.
I first assume that candidates are office motivated, meaning they care
only about maximizing their probability of winning each election and do not
care about the implemented policy. Later I will relax this assumption and
instead look at policy motivated candidates. In this case I will assume that
in each body there is a Democratic candidate and a Republican candidate.
The Democratic candidates have ideal points that are lower than the median
House voter, while the Republican candidates have ideal points higher than
the median Senate voter. I allow the preferences of each Democratic and
Republican candidate to differ in each body although as will be shown later
this will have little effect on the resulting equilibrium.
During the election the candidates choose positions that they are com-
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mitted to during the bargaining process, either the policy they will propose
or the range of policies they would accept. I assume that any time a voter
is indifferent between an outcome with compromise and an outcome with
gridlock they will vote for the outcome with compromise. I also examine the
equilibrium both with and without the existence of individual valence effects.
When these do exist, each candidate has an individual valence term, vi that
is revealed after the candidates choose their strategies but before the election
are randomly distributed with distribution F and expected value 0.
Each body of the legislature has its own electorate. Each electorate is
comprised of voters with ideal points between 0 and 1. The median House and
median Senate voters are the voters in the House and Senate, respectively,
such that 50% of the electorate in each body has an ideal point lower than
the median voter and 50% have an ideal point higher than the median voter.
The ideal points of the two median voters are allowed to differ and WLOG I
assume that the ideal point of the median House voter is less than or equal
to the ideal point of the median Senate voter.
3.3.1 Definition of Equilibria
An equilibrium involves the strategies played by each candidate in each body.
Since the candidates will not know before the elections if their body will be
the proposing or responding body, they must specify strategies for each case.
This means a candidate’s election platform includes both the proposals the
candidates will make if their body is chosen to be the proposing body as well
as the set of proposals that they would accept if their body is chosen to be
the responding body.
Since the candidates are choosing strategies in two dimensions, their pro-
posal choices will depend on the acceptance sets of other candidates and
vice versa. This means there are many opportunities for multiple equilibria.
To eliminate some equilibria I will only consider subgame perfect equilibria.
This is in order to eliminate strategies that clearly would not be played on
off the equilibrium paths.
For example, if the Republican Senate candidate is currently proposing
xp = 0.75 and the Democratic House candidate is only accepting xp ≤ 0.75,
the Democratic House candidate could change his acceptance set to include
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any xp ∈ [0, 1] and since both acceptance sets include the Republican Sen-
ate candidate’s proposal, there would not be a difference in the outcome.
However, if the Democratic House candidate did this, then the Republican
Senate candidate would change his proposal to something higher, since it will
now be accepted by the Democratic House candidate. Therefore, this change
would not be subgame perfect.
3.3.2 Equivalence of Equilibria
An equilibrium in this model consists of the candidates specifying both their
intended proposals if they are the proposer as well as the set of policies that
they would accept if they were the responder. Depending on who wins in the
election, one of only two possible policies will be proposed and therefore the
policy space can be partitioned into at most three distinct sets. This means
that there are a continuum of acceptance sets that would all lead to the same
outcome. The only relevant question is whether or not the proposed policy
is in the acceptance set of the elected responder.
Because of this, there may appear to be multiple equilibria that yield
the same outcome. For example, if the proposed policy turns out to be
0.4 then both acceptance sets [0.5, 1] and [0.6, 1] would lead to gridlock. In
order to eliminate the plethora of identical equilibria, I will define a sense of
equivalence to refine the set of equilibria.
Definition 1 Two outcomes are outcome equivalent if for all possible poli-
cies, xp ∈ [0, 1], they lead to the same probability of xp being enacted
This definition implies that any changes to a candidate’s acceptance set
that do not alter the candidate’s winning probabilities and do not affect
whether or not the proposed policy will be accepted can be considered as a
single equilibrium.
3.4 Office Motivated Candidates
I first consider office motivated candidates, where each of the candidates
running for election care only about maximizing their probability of being
elected. This means that candidates have no preferences on the implemented
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policy and therefore any notion of party affiliation would be purely nominal.
Office motivated candidates can thus be thought of as two independent can-
didates running against each other.
3.4.1 Without Valence
I start with the case of no valence terms. The election results will be known
with certainty and therefore the median voters in the House and Senate are
able to completely coordinate with each other. Since there are no meaningful
parties when the candidates are office motivated, I will refer to the candi-
dates in each body as Candidates A and B. Here, βH and βS are the ideal
policies of the median House and Senate voter, respectively.
Equilibrium: (Office Motivated Candidates Without Valence)
Any policy, xp, such that Ui(xp) ≥ Ui(x0) − t for both of the median voters
and such that βH ≤ xp ≤ βS can be supported as an equilibrium by the can-
didates playing the following strategies:
Both candidates in the House propose xp and accept any proposal x ≤ xp
Both candidates in the Senate propose xp and accept any proposal x ≥ xp
Proof Suppose Candidate A in the House wishes to propose another policy.
If he proposes x < xp then no matter who is elected in the Senate the proposal
will be rejected and lead to gridlock. This will give the median House voter
a utility of UH(x0)− tH if he elects Candidate A and a utility of UH(xp) if he
elects Candidate B. Since UH(xp) ≥ UH(x0)− tH , he will elect Candidate B.
Now suppose Candidate A proposes a policy, x > xp. In this case, no
matter who is elected in the Senate the proposal will be accepted. This will
give the median House voter a utility of UH(x) if Candidate A is elected.
However, since x > xp ≥ βH , which is the median House voter’s ideal point,
it must be that UH(x) < UH(xp). Therefore the median House voter will
again elect Candidate B.
Now suppose Candidate A wishes to deviate from the equilibrium accep-
tance set. There are many deviations that would not affect the implemented
policy. For example, accepting any policy x ∈ [xp − , xp] would still lead to
every proposal being accepted and thus would be equivalent to the current
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equilibrium. These deviations would not affect the median House voter’s
utility and therefore wouldn’t influence his decision.
Candidate A could change his acceptance set to include some policies x >
xp. On the equilibrium path, this would not have any effect since both
candidates in the Senate are proposing xp. However, on the off equilibrium
paths, candidates in the Senate could then propose a policy x > xp and since
xp ≥ βH , this would lead to a lower utility for the median House voter and
thus cause him to elect Candidate B instead.
Candidate A’s other option is to change his acceptance set to not include
xp, making the acceptance set equivalent to [0, βH). If Candidate A is elected
in this case the proposal by the Senate candidate would be rejected, leading
to gridlock. However, since UH(x0) − tH ≤ UH(xp), this would also lead to
a lower utility for the median House voter and thus again lead to Candidate
B being elected.
Similarly Candidate B in the House and both candidates in the Senate
have no profitable deviations.
In this case, because there is no valence term and therefore there is no
uncertainty in the election results, as long as there is some outcome that
both median voters prefer to gridlock, they will be able to coordinate in
order to avoid gridlock. Furthermore, as the following observation shows,
there will always be some policy that can be supported as an equilibrium.
Observation 1 The set of policies that can be supported as an equilibrium
is non-empty as long as tH > 0 or tS > 0
Proof Any policy that both candidates prefer to gridlock can be supported
as an equilibrium, thus it remains to show that if tH > 0 or tS > 0 then there
exists a policy that both candidates prefer to gridlock.
If tH > 0 then UH(x0) > UH(x0) − tH , which means that the median
House voter will prefer x0 to gridlock. Since UH(xp) is continuous, there
is some xp > x0 such that UH(x0) > UH(xp) > UH(x0). Since xp > x0,
US(xp) > US(x0) and since tS ≥ 0, US(x0) ≥ US(x0) − tS. Therefore, both
candidates prefer xp to gridlock.
Similarly, if tS > 0 then there exists some xp < x0 such that both candi-
dates prefer to gridlock.
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This means that there will always be a supported policy and since in
any such equilibrium, the candidates propose policies that will always be
accepted by the winning candidates, there will never be any outcome that
involves gridlock. Note that there is not a unique equilibrium. For each
policy that could be supported as an equilibria, there is a continuum of
different acceptance sets that the candidates could choose that would lead
to the same outcome. For example, if the candidates in the House accepted
any x ∈ [xp − , xp], this would still lead to xp being implemented since
in equilibrium no policy less than xp will be proposed by any candidate.
These would be considered outcome equivalent and are in effect only a single
outcome.
However, even after condensing outcome equivalent equilibria, there are
still a continuum of possible equilibria. Any policy that both candidates
prefer to gridlock can be supported as an equilibria and as seen in the above
observation, this set will always be non-empty.
Since there are multiple equilibria, some will favor the median Senate voter
(namely those with xp > x0), while others will favor the median House voter
(those with xp < x0). However, in every case both median voters prefer xp
to gridlock. This means that the House and Senate median voter are playing
a game of Battle of the Sexes.
3.4.2 With Valence
Next I look at the case where each candidate has a private valence term. This
valence term is revealed after the candidates choose their election strategy
but before the median voters make their election decision. The valence terms
of each candidates are only revealed to the median voter in the respective
body, meaning the median voters will not be able to completely coordinate
between themselves.
In each body let vA and vB be the valence for candidates A and B, re-
spectively and let F (v) be the distribution of vB − vA. I will assume that
F (0) = 0.5, which means that either candidate has the same probability of
having the higher valence draw. For the time being I continue to assume
that candidate are office motivated. In this case the equilibrium strategy for
the candidates is the same as in the case of no valence terms.
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Equilibrium: (Office Motivated Candidates With Valence)
Any policy, xp, such that Ui(xp) ≥ Ui(x0) − t for both of the median voters
and such that βH ≤ xp ≤ βS can be supported as an equilibrium by the can-
didates playing the following strategies:
Both candidates in the House propose xp and accept any proposal x ≤ xp
Both candidates in the Senate propose xp and accept any proposal x ≥ xp
Proof If both candidates are following the equilibrium then the median
House voter will elect whichever candidate has the higher valence draw. This
means that Candidate A will be elected if
vB − vA ≤ 0
which will happen with probability F (0) = 0.5.
Now suppose that Candidate A in the House proposes a policy x < xp. No
matter which candidate is elected in the Senate the proposal will be rejected
and lead to gridlock. Therefore the median House voter’s utility if he elects
Candidate A is UH(x0)− tH + vA and if he elects Candidate B his utility will
be UH(xp) + vB. He will therefore elect Candidate A if
UH(x0)− tH + vA > UH(xp) + vB
or if
vB − vA < UH(x0)− tH − UH(xp)
Therefore, the probability of Candidate A being elected is F (UH(x0)−tH−
UH(xp)).
Ui(xp) ≥ Ui(x0)− t⇒ UH(x0)− tH − UH(xp) ≤ 0
which means that F (UH(x0) − tH − UH(xp)) ≤ 0.5. Therefore Candidate
A will prefer proposing xp.
Now suppose that Candidate A in the House proposes a policy x > xp.
The proposal will be accepted no matter who wins in the Senate. This means
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that the median House voter will receive utility of UH(x) + vA if he elects
Candidate A and UH(xp) + vB if he elects Candidate B. He will therefore
elect Candidate A if
UH(x) + vA ≥ UH(xp) + vB
⇒ vB − vA ≥ UH(x)− UH(xp)
which means Candidate A will be elected with probability F (UH(x) −
UH(xp)). However, xp ≥ βH , x > βH and therefore UH(x) < UH(xp), which
means that F (UH(x)−UH(xp)) < 0.5. Therefore, Candidate A will maximize
his probability of being elected by proposing xp.
Now suppose Candidate A wishes to deviate from the equilibrium accep-
tance set. There are again many deviations that would not affect the imple-
mented policy. The only meaningful changes would be if Candidate A was
willing to accept some policies x > xp or if he was unwilling to accept xp.
If he accepts policies x > xp then in the off the equilibrium path outcomes,
the Senate candidates would propose a higher policy, which would lead to a
lower utility for the median House voter. This would decrease Candidate A’s
probability of winning. If Candidate A did not accept xp then any proposal
by the Senate candidates would be rejected and lead to gridlock. Since
UH(x0) − tH ≤ UH(xp), this would also lower the median House voter’s
utility and therefore decrease the probability of Candidate A being elected.
Therefore Candidate A in the House has no profitable deviations in either
his proposal or his acceptance set. Similarly, neither Candidate B in the
House nor either candidate in the Senate have any profitable deviations.
The results show that whenever candidates are office motivated there will
never be an equilibrium that involves gridlock.
3.5 Policy Motivated Candidates
Next I look at the case of policy motivated candidates. This means that
in each body there is a Democratic candidate, who wants as low a policy as
possible, and a Republican candidate, who wants as high a policy as possible.
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I again start with the case where the candidates do not have an individual
valence term and then examine the case when they do.
3.5.1 Without Valence
In this case, the equilibrium is as follows:
Equilibrium: (Policy Motivated Candidates Without Valence)
Any policy, xp, such that Ui(xp) ≥ Ui(x0) − t for both of the median voters
and such that βH ≤ xp ≤ βS can be supported as an equilibrium by the can-
didates playing the following strategies:
The Republican candidate in the House proposes xp and accepts any x ≥ xp
The Democratic candidate in the House proposes xp and accepts any x ≤ xp
The Republican candidate in the Senate proposes xp and accepts any x ≥ xp
The Democratic candidate in the Senate proposes xp and accepts any x ≤ xp
The median House voter elects the Democratic candidate and the median
Senate voter elects the Republican candidate
Proof Suppose the Republican House candidate wishes to propose a higher
policy. Since the median Senate voter is electing the Republican candidate,
the proposal will be accepted. However, this will lead to a lower utility for the
median House voter, who will instead elect the Democratic House candidate.
If the Democratic House candidate wishes to propose a lower policy, it will be
rejected by the Republican Senate candidate and lead to gridlock, which leads
to a lower utility for the median House voter and therefore the Republican
House candidate will be elected instead.
If a candidate proposes a policy that is not preferred to gridlock by the
median voter, then the median voter will simply elect the opposing candidate.
If a candidate proposes a policy that is more extreme than the median voter’s
ideal point then the opposing candidate can propose the median voter’s ideal
point (or even a policy slightly more preferred by the candidate) and be
elected.
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If either House candidate changes their acceptance set to not include xp, it
will lead to the Republican candidate’s proposal being rejected and therefore
gridlock, which will cause the median voter to elect the opposing candidate.
Therefore neither candidate in the House has a profitable deviation and
similarly, neither candidate in the Senate has a profitable deviation either.
The results are very similar to the case of office motivated candidates.
Namely, as long as the policy is preferred by both candidates, it can be
supported as an equilibrium. This also means since there will always be
some policies that both median voters prefer to gridlock, there will never be
an equilibrium that involves gridlock.
3.5.2 With Valence
Proposals
First consider a House candidate’s policy proposal decision. Without valence
effects both candidates are proposing xH .
The Republican candidate has the option of proposing xp > xH . Any
such proposal would certainly be accepted by the Senate median voter since
US(xp) > US(xH). Without valence effects, this would lead to the House
median voter always electing the Democratic candidate. Now, however, if
the valence draw is large enough for the Republican candidate, the House
median voter may still elect the Republican candidate even though it would
lead to a worse policy for the House median voter. Therefore, the Republican
candidate now has an incentive to increase his policy proposal. Specifically,
he will consider his expected utility of proposing xp = xR.
The expected utility depends on whether his proposal of xR will be ac-
cepted by the winning Senate candidate, which depends on both of the Senate
candidates acceptance sets. In general this will be an endogenous decision
by the Senate candidates but from the House candidate’s point of view it
can be treated as exogenous. The House Republican candidate’s expected
utility, and therefore proposal decision, will depend on which proposals will
or will not be accepted by the Senate candidates.
Let yDS be the highest proposal that is in the Democratic Senate candidates
acceptance set and let yRS be the lowest proposal that is in the Republican
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Senate candidates acceptance set.
The Republican House candidate’s expected utility of proposing xR is
EUR =
PRH (U(x0)− tR) + (1− PRH )EUR(D) xR > yDS , xR < yRS
PRHP
D
S U(xR) + P
R
HP
R
S (U(x0)− tR) + (1− PRH )EUR(D) xR ≤ yDS , xR < yRS
PRHP
D
S (U(x0)− tR) + PRHPRS U(xR) + (1− PRH )EUR(D) xR > yDS , xR ≥ yRS
PRHUR(xR) + (1− PRH )EUR(D) xR ≤ yDS , xR ≥ yRS
where PRH is the probability of the Republican candidate being elected in
the House and EUR(D) is the Republican’s expected utility if the Democrat
is elected.
The Democratic candidate in the House previously could not lower his
proposed policy or else the median Senate voter would simply elect the Re-
publican and reject the offer. With valence effects, that is not necessarily
true. If the Democratic candidate in the House proposes xp < xH and if
the median Senate voter receives a high enough valence for the Democratic
candidate, then he may be willing to accept xp, even though it is worse than
gridlock. This gives the Democratic candidate in the House an incentive to
lower his proposal. He will also consider his expected utility of proposing
xp = xH :
EUD = P
D
H P
D
S UD(xH) + P
D
H (1− PDS )(UD(x0)− tD) + PRHEUD(R) (3.1)
where PDH is the probability of the Democratic candidate being elected in
the House and EUD(R) is the Democratic candidate’s expected utility if the
Republican candidate is elected in the House.
For the median House voter the decision is between electing the Republican
or electing the Democrat and having a PRS probability of gridlock. The
median House voter will therefore vote for the Republican if
EUH(R) + vR ≥ PDS UH(xDH) + PRS (UH(x0)− tH) + vD (3.2)
Which means that
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PRH = 1− F (PDS UH(xH) + PRS (UH(x0)− tH)− EUH(R)) (3.3)
where F is the CDF of vR − vD.
When making his policy decision, the Republican House candidate would
like to maximize his expected utility by setting ∂EUR
∂xRH
= 0. However, EUR is
very likely discontinuous at the boundaries of the Senate candidate’s accep-
tance sets, namely yDS and y
R
S . Because of this, EUR will not be differentiable
at these points and therefore there may be no point such that ∂EUR
∂xRH
= 0. Fur-
thermore, even if a policy exists such that ∂EUR
∂xRH
= 0, it does not guarantee
that it is a global maximum as there could be a jump in utility at yDS or y
R
S .
The Republican House candidate must therefore compare multiple policy
proposals. Specifically, he will compare the utility from xp such that
∂EUR
∂xRH
= 0
if such a policy exists, yDS , and y
R
S . For y
D
S , in order to have the policy
accepted, it must be that xp ≤ yDS and similarly xp ≥ yRS in order to be
accepted. This means that the Republican House candidate will need to
compare limxp→yD−S EUR(xp) and limxp→yR+S EUR(xp).
Republican House candidate will therefore propose whichever policy satis-
fies
EUR(xp) = max[EUR(x
∗), lim
xp→yD−S
EUR(xp), lim
xp→yR+S
EUR(xp)] (3.4)
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUR(x
∗)
∂xRH
= 0.
The Democratic House candidate must also evaluate potential Senate ac-
ceptance sets. However, the Senate Republican candidate’s decision can be
anticipated. Since xDH < xH , the median Senate voter will always prefer
gridlock over xDH and since the Republican candidate’s ideal point is to the
right of the median Senate voter, the Republican candidate will also prefer
gridlock to xDH . This means that if the Republican Senate candidate were to
include xDH in his acceptance set it would decrease his probability of winning
as well as his utility. Therefore, the Republican Senate candidate will always
reject xDH
This means that the Democratic House candidate must only consider two
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policies: xp such that
∂EUD
∂xDH
= 0 and xDS , the lowest policy in the acceptance
set of the Senate Democratic candidate. He will therefore choose whichever
policy satisfies
EUR(xp) = max[EUD(x
∗), lim
xp→yD−S
EUD(xp)] (3.5)
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUD(x
∗)
∂xDH
= 0.
A similar occurrence happens in the Senate, where now the Democratic
Senate candidate’s expected utility is discontinuous depending on whether
or not his proposed policy will be accepted by the House candidates. The
Democratic Senate candidate will therefore propose whichever policy satisfies
EUD(xp) = max[EUD(x
∗), lim
xp→yR−H
EUD(xp), lim
xp→yD+H
EUD(xp)] (3.6)
where again, x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUD(x
∗)
∂xDS
= 0.
The Republican Senate candidate will only consider the acceptance behav-
ior of the Republican House candidate since the Democratic House candidate
will always reject the Republican Senate candidate’s proposal. Therefore the
Republican Senate candidate will propose whichever policy satisfies
EUR(xp) = max[EUR(x
∗), lim
xp→yR+S
EUR(xp)]
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUR(x
∗)
∂xRH
= 0.
Acceptance Sets
First consider the Democratic House candidate’s acceptance set decisions.
Since xRS ≥ xS, both the median House voter as well as the Democratic
candidate will prefer gridlock to xRS . Therefore rejecting x
R
S will increase
both the Democratic candidate’s probability of winning as well as his utility
if he wins. He then has to decide whether to accept xDS or not. If UD(x
D
S ) ≥
UD(x0)− tD then this is an easy decision. In this case both the Democratic
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candidate and the median House voter prefer xDS to compromise and therefore
the Democratic House candidate will certainly accept it.
If UD(x
D
S ) < UD(x0) − tD then the Democratic candidate must decide
whether to accept xDS . If he does it will mean a lower utility but if he does
not then it will lower his probability of winning. His expected utility if he
accepts xDS is
EUDH = P
D
H [P
D
S UD(x
D
S ) + P
R
S (UD(x0)− tD)] + PRHEUDH (R) (3.7)
and his expected utility if he does not accept xDS is
EˆU
D
H = Pˆ
D
H [UD(x0)− tD] + PˆRHEUDH (R) (3.8)
where EUD(R) is the expected utility if the Republican House candidate
wins. This depends on the acceptance set of the Republican House candidate,
namely whether they are willing to accept xDS . If the Republican House
candidate is accepting xDS then
EUDH (R) = P
D
S UD(x
D
S ) + P
R
S UD(x
R
S ) (3.9)
and if the Republican House candidate is not accepting xDS then
EUDH (R) = P
D
S (UD(x0)− tD) + PRS UD(xRS ) (3.10)
The Democratic House candidate will then accept xDS if EU
D
H ≥ EˆU
D
H .
Turning to the Republican House candidate, who must decide whether or
not to accept xDS and/or x
R
S . x
R
S > xS > x0 and therefore the Republican
House candidate will certainly prefer xRS to gridlock. He must then decide
whether or not to accept xDS . If he does then his expected utility will be
EUR = P
R
H [P
D
S UR(x
D
S ) + P
R
S UR(x
R
S )] + P
D
HEU
S
H(D) (3.11)
and if he does not then his expected utility will be
EˆUR = Pˆ
R
H [Pˆ
D
S (UR(x0)− tR) + PˆRS UR(xRS )] + PˆDHEUSH(D) (3.12)
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where EURH(D) is the expected utility if the Democratic House candidate
wins and depends on whether the Democratic House candidate will accept
xDS or not as determined above. Note that each candidate’s probability of
winning will depend on whether or not the Republican House candidate is
compromising, so that P ji 6= Pˆ ji . Specifically, the probabilities depend on the
utility of the median House voter. Given the choice between a compromising
Republican candidate or the Democratic candidate, the median House voter
will elect the Republican with probability
PRH = 1− F (PRS [UH(x0)− tH − UH(xRS )]) (3.13)
and given the choice between a non compromising Republican and the
Democrat, the median House voter will elect the Republican with probability
PˆRH = 1−F (PDS [UH(xDS )−(UH(x0)−tH)]+PRS [UH(x0)−tH−UH(xRS )]) (3.14)
where F is again the CDF of vR − vD. The Republican House candidate
will then choose to compromise if EUR ≥ EˆUR.
Similarly in the Senate, the Democratic Senate candidate will always be
willing to compromise with the Democratic House candidate since xDH < x0
and must decide whether to accept xRH . The Republican Senate candidate
will always reject xDH but must decide whether to accept x
R
H .
Equilibrium Criteria
Combining all of the previous findings, an equilibrium must satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. The Democratic House candidate will propose whichever policy satisfies
EUD(xp) = max[EUD(x
∗), lim
xp→yD−S
EUD(xp)]
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUD(x
∗)
∂xDH
= 0.
He will accept any xp ≤ xDS if UD(xp) ≥ UD(x0)− tD or if UD(xp) < UD(x0)−
tD but EU
D
H > EˆU
D
H and will always reject xp ≥ xRS
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2. The Republican House candidate will propose whichever policy satisfies
EUR(xp) = max[EUR(x
∗), lim
xp→yD−S
EUR(xp), lim
xp→yR+S
EUR(xp)]
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUR(x
∗)
∂xRH
= 0.
He will accept any xp ≥ xDS if EUR ≥ EˆUR and accept any xP ≥ xRS if
EURH < EˆU
R
H
3. The Democratic Senate candidate will propose whichever policy satisfies
EUD(xp) = max[EUD(x
∗), lim
xp→yR−H
EUD(xp), lim
xp→yD+H
EUD(xp)]
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUD(x
∗)
∂xDS
= 0.
He will accept any xp ≤ xRH if EUD ≥ EˆUD and accept any xP ≤ xDH if
EUDS < EˆU
D
S
4. The Republican Senate candidate will propose whichever policy satisfies
EUR(xp) = max[EUR(x
∗), lim
xp→yR+S
EUR(xp)]
where x∗, if it exists, is such that ∂EUR(x
∗)
∂xRH
= 0.
He will accept any xp ≥ xRH if UR(xp) ≥ UR(x0)−tR or if UR(xp) < UR(x0)−tR
but EURS > EˆU
R
S and will always reject xp ≤ xHD
Findings
An interesting note is that because the expected utilities have discontinuities,
the equilibrium is not necessarily unique. If, for example, ∂EUR(x
∗)
∂xRH
= 0 when
the Republican House candidate proposes 0.4 but the Democratic Senate
candidate will only accept policies less than or equal to 0.39 then depending
on the utility functions, it might be in the Republican House candidate’s
interest to propose 0.39 instead of 0.4. However, if this is true then if the
Democratic Senate candidate is only accepting xp ≤ 0.38, the Republican
candidate may also wish to propose 0.38. Therefore, similar to the case
of office motivated candidates, there could be multiple policies that can be
supported as an equilibrium.
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This means that it may be possible for candidates to exploit the proposals
of other candidates by strategically choosing to only accept certain policies
that they know will be proposed. This is not true when candidates are policy
motivated but there is no valence term involved. In this case, candidates are
unable to deviate from the median voters’ ideal positions and so there is no
way for candidates to be exploited.
A related result is that a possible equilibrium is for the candidates to
continue to propose the median voter’s ideal policies, despite the fact that
there are valence terms. This is especially likely if the magnitude of the
valence terms are approaching 0. This finding differs from most models of
policy motivated candidates, such as Groseclose (2001), Kartik and McAfee
(2007) Schofield (2003), where the introduction of valence terms will always
have the effect of moving the policies away from the median voter’s ideal
point.
The main point of interest in this paper is to determine why candidates
would choose not to compromise, even though there will always be poli-
cies that both median voters prefer to gridlock. This suggests that there is
something discouraging candidates from compromising, even though it would
likely increase their probability of being elected. The reason for this is shown
in the next few observations.
Observation 2 If only one candidate is compromising then that candidate
and the candidate of the opposite party in the other body will have a higher
probability of winning
This is a rather interesting result that implies that when one candidate
compromises, it can actually end up helping candidates of the other party
more than it does their own. Normally the median voters would wish to
coordinate in order to elect members of the same party and avoid conflict.
If one candidate is compromising then the median voter will want to vote
for that candidate. This, however, actually gives an incentive to the other
median voter to vote for the candidate in the opposing party. The reason is
that if the compromising candidate wins, there will be no conflict no matter
who wins in the other body. However, if the compromising candidate loses,
the only way to avoid conflict is for the non-compromising candidate’s fellow
party member in the opposing body to also win.
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If, for example, the Democratic candidate is compromising in the House
and the Republican candidate wins in the Senate then there will be no conflict
no matter who wins in the House. Although this gives the median voters a
way to completely eliminate conflict, they still may not do so if the valence
draw is extreme enough to sway one or both of them. However, it would
generally take a more extreme draw to do so than if no candidates were
compromising, so while the probability of conflict is not 0 it has been reduced.
If one of these candidates was willing to compromise, then we would again
see the coordination incentives from the previous case. That is, in order to
avoid conflict the median voters would have an incentive to vote for whichever
candidate is compromising and the member of the opposing party in the other
body. This is further seen with the following results:
Observation 3 If only one candidate compromises and t → ∞, the proba-
bility of the compromising candidate winning goes to 1 and the probability of
winning for the candidate of the opposite party in the opposing body also goes
to 1
If t = ∞ then even the smallest probability of conflict will outweigh any
valence draws for the median voters, meaning they will always try to avoid
gridlock with certainty. When no candidates are compromising this becomes
impossible as the median voters have no way of coordinating. However if, for
example, a candidate in the House is compromising, then the median Senate
voter can elect the candidate of the opposing party and ensure there will be
no gridlock.
Observation 4 If only one candidate is compromising, the candidates of the
compromising party will receive a lower expected utility than the candidates
of the non-compromising party.
This follows from observation 2. If a Democratic candidate is willing to
compromise, then not only will the Republican candidates receive a higher
utility due to their policy being implemented rather than gridlock, the Re-
publican candidate also has a higher probability of winning in the opposite
body, which further increases the probability that the Republican policy will
be implemented.
This does not mean that a compromising candidate will receive a lower
utility than if he refused to compromise. By agreeing to compromise, the
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candidate helps to eliminate deadweight loss associated with gridlock. This
observation simply states that the majority of that increase in social wel-
fare goes to the non-compromising candidates. However, the compromising
candidate will still be at least weakly better off than when refusing to com-
promise.
Observation 5 If only one candidate is compromising, as t→∞, the pro-
posed policy of the opposing party’s candidate in the opposite body approaches
the candidate’s ideal point.
This again follows from Observation 2. If one candidate is compromising
then the median voter in the opposing body will have more incentive to vote
for the candidate of the opposing party. As t→∞, this will dwarf any other
considerations and even if the candidate proposes the most extreme position
possible, the median voter will still elect him since it is the only way to avoid
gridlock with certainty. The candidate of the non-compromising party is able
to exploit this in order to ensure their most preferred policy is enacted.
Note that even though the compromising candidate is being fully exploited
for his willingness to compromise, in equilibrium he still does not wish to
switch to not compromising as he also wishes to avoid gridlock. Refusing
to compromise would lead to a positive probability of gridlock and thus an
expected utility of −∞, which is worse than a utility of simply 0.
These results begin to shed some light as to why we might see parties
refusing to compromise. When a party does compromise it is actually the
non-compromising party that benefits at the compromising party’s expense.
Of course if both parties desire a compromise then this turns into a game of
chicken, where each party is hoping the other party will be the one to blink.
It is easy to think that this could lead to problems in a practical setting.
This means that when only one party is compromising, the non-compromising
party actually prefers to have a higher penalty. Of course either party could
be the one that is compromising, with the parties receiving higher utility
if they are the one not compromising and the lowest utility if both parties
refuse to compromise. This means that the parties play a game of chicken
over who will compromise.
An interesting note here is that aside from the game of chicken being
played, there is also a prisoner’s dilemma game being played with respect to
the proposed policies. Since the utility functions are concave, both parties
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would ex ante prefer positions that are closer to the median so that they don’t
receive a much lower utility should the other party win. In fact the parties
receive the highest ex ante utility when both locate at .5. Of course this is
not incentive compatible as each party wants to increase their own utility by
moving away from the median, which ends up hurting both parties.
3.6 Conclusion
Gridlock is an all too common occurrence. Even in political situations in
which upcoming elections would be expected to put enough political pressure
on lawmakers to come to an agreement in order to avoid costly delays, there
is often failure to reach a settlement in time. These outcomes are not Pareto
efficient, suggesting there is something else that is leading to the breakdowns.
I introduce a model that combines bargaining and elections. Candidates
and voters must weigh not only the proposals that are made but also the
chance that those proposals will be accepted by other candidates. Gridlock
leads to a large deadweight loss and thus the large costs associated with
gridlock should be enough to encourage voters to elect candidates who will
compromise with each other. However, I find that despite the fact that
disagreements make voters worse off, in some cases voters will still elect
candidates who are unwilling to compromise with each other.
Election uncertainty is a large driving force for these disagreements. When
the results of elections are known with certainty, candidates will always pro-
pose policies that will be accepted after the elections even when the candi-
dates are policy motivated. However, when a random valence term is in-
troduced to the elections, candidates will have enough opportunity to win
despite proposing socially inefficient policies that they will be encouraged to
choose more extreme policies. This will in turn lead to a positive probability
of gridlock, which will end up hurting all parties involved.
Policy motivation is another factor in gridlock. When candidates are not
simply attempting to maximize their chances of being elected but instead
care about the policy that will be implemented then they will choose more
extreme policies even though it is not in their best political interests. These
extreme positions make it much more likely that two candidates who have
incompatible views will be elected and lead to gridlock.
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This is consistent with observed outcomes. Congressional negotiations
almost always grind to a halt in the months or even year preceding an election,
especially before presidential elections. Both parties often prefer to wait until
after the election in the hopes that they will pick up enough seats in Congress
or even the White House in order to be able to negotiate from a stronger
position. It is also commonly the more extreme members of a party that
are the loudest voices preventing compromises. Members of the Tea Party
often openly admit that they would prefer gridlock to a compromise with
Democrats.
The results also show that when two parties bargain they end up playing
a game of chicken in determining whether to compromise. Although both
candidates may be willing to compromise, doing so has the potential to lead
to exploitation by the other candidate. Thus while both candidates desire
a compromise, they both prefer not to be the party that is compromising.
This can lead to a dangerous game played by both parties and leads to a
very real chance that an agreement will not be reached, even when the cost
of gridlock is extremely high.
This may shed some light on the constant recurrence of Congressional grid-
lock. The often high costs of gridlock, such as sequestration or government
shutdowns, may not actually play as much of a role in the parties’ decisions
as imagined, which helps explain why high costs alone are not always enough
to encourage compromise between the two parties.
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